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THE RETURN OF THE ROGUE 
Kimberly D. Krawiec∗ 
The “rogue trader”—a famed figure of the 1990s—recently has returned to 
prominence due largely to two phenomena. First, recent U.S. mortgage market 
volatility spilled over into stock, commodity, and derivative markets worldwide, 
causing large financial institution losses and revealing previously hidden 
unauthorized positions. Second, the rogue trader has gained importance as banks 
around the world have focused more attention on operational risk in response to 
regulatory changes prompted by the Basel II Capital Accord. This Article contends 
that of the many regulatory options available to the Basel Committee for 
addressing operational risk it arguably chose the worst: an enforced self-
regulatory regime unlikely to substantially alter financial institutions’ ability to 
successfully manage operational risk. That regime also poses the danger of high 
costs, a false sense of security, and perverse incentives. Particularly with respect 
to the low-frequency, high-impact events—including rogue trading—that may be 
the greatest threat to bank stability and soundness, attempts at enforced self-
regulation are unlikely to significantly reduce operational risk, because those 
financial institutions with the highest operational risk are the least likely to 
credibly assess that risk and set aside adequate capital under a regime of enforced 
self-regulation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The rogue trader—a figure that captured public attention in the 1990s1—
has returned to the spotlight, largely due to two phenomena. First, market volatility 
stemming from problems in the U.S. mortgage market spilled over into stock, 
commodity, and derivative markets worldwide, causing large losses at many 
financial institutions and bringing to light previously hidden unauthorized 
positions. As a result, a number of financial institutions, including Société 
Générale, recently have disclosed large rogue trading losses. The French 
investment, banking, and financial services group revealed in January 2008 that a 
junior trader, Jerome Kerviel, had lost over $7 billion on unauthorized trades in 
equities and equity index futures, becoming the largest rogue trader in history.2 
More broadly, the debilitating losses at many financial institutions in the wake of 
the current credit crisis—while not specifically attributed to rogue employees—
have been blamed to a large extent on lax internal controls and oversight, 
combined with an industry culture that sacrificed prudent risk management in the 
pursuit of superior profits.3 
Second, the rogue trader has returned to prominence due to domestic and 
international regulatory changes that have forced banks worldwide to focus more 
attention on operational risk, an important component of which is rogue trading. 
Specifically, the Basel II Capital Accord requires banks to include in their capital 
charges amounts sufficient to protect against anticipated operational losses, 
including losses from unauthorized trades, transforming what was once a residual 
risk category into a growing multi-billion dollar risk management industry.4 
                                                                                                                
    1. For example, numerous popular books and movies memorialized infamous 
rogue traders of the decade, such as Nick Leeson and Joseph Jett. See generally LUKE HUNT 
& KAREN HEINRICH, BARINGS LOST: NICK LEESON AND THE COLLAPSE OF BARINGS PLC 
(1996); JOSEPH JETT & SABRA CHARTRAND, BLACK AND WHITE ON WALL STREET: THE 
UNTOLD STORY OF THE MAN WRONGLY ACCUSED OF BRINGING DOWN KIDDER PEABODY 
(1999); NICK LEESON & EDWARD WHITLEY, ROGUE TRADER: HOW I BROUGHT DOWN 
BARINGS BANK AND SHOOK THE FINANCIAL WORLD (1996); JUDITH H. RAWNSLEY, TOTAL 
RISK: NICK LEESON AND THE FALL OF BARINGS BANK (1995); ROGUE TRADER (Miramax 
1999). 
    2. Other reported losses include: MF Global ($141.5m), Caisse d’Epargne 
(EUR 600m), Crédit Agricole (EUR 250m), Credit Suisse (CHF 2.86bn), Lehman Brothers 
(undisclosed amount), Merrill Lynch ($18m), and Morgan Stanley ($120m). Scheherazade 
Daneshkhu, Caisse d’Epargne in €600m Loss on Derivatives, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2008, at 
20; Associated Press, Rogue Wheat Trader Blamed for $141 Million Loss, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
28, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/28/business/apee-wheat.html; 
Louise Story, A Question of Value, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2008, at C1. 
    3. Eric Dash & Julie Creswell, The Reckoning: Citigroup Saw No Red Flags 
even as It Made Bolder Bets, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/23/business/23citi.html (blaming Citigroup’s $65 billion 
loss on poor risk controls, lax oversight, and a corporate culture that emphasized greater risk 
taking in an attempt to expand market share and profits). 
    4. CELENT, OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT: THREE, TWO, ONE . . . LIFTOFF? 4 
(2006), http://www.celent.com/reports/OpRiskMgmt2006/OperationalRiskMarket.pdf 
(predicting a growth in operational risk management expenditures at a compound annual 
rate of 5.5%, from $992 million in 2006 to $1.16 billion in 2009). 
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With this move, the Bank for International Settlements located 
operational risk management squarely within the category of “enforced self-
regulation,” also sometimes referred to as “responsive regulation,” “negotiated 
governance,” or “collaborative governance.” Although the Basel II Accord 
requires banks to protect against potential operational losses by holding capital 
specifically allocated for that purpose, it also gives them an unprecedented amount 
of flexibility in choosing how to measure operational risk and the resulting capital 
requirement. For example, under the Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA)—
the most liberal of the three approaches available to banks for calculating the 
operational risk capital charge—banks are allowed to choose their own 
methodology for assessing operational risk. 
Critics have raised a number of objections to the Basel II operational risk 
provisions, including a lack of definitional clarity, concerns over data scarcity, and 
objections that the necessary modeling techniques are insufficiently developed. 
Few, however, have examined the Basel II operational risk requirements as a 
species of enforced self-regulation with its attendant costs and benefits. Theories 
of enforced self-regulation have been extremely influential, both in the academic 
community and among regulatory agencies, courts, and legislatures. Indeed, the 
international banking community itself embraced enforced self-regulation in 1996, 
when the Basel Committee allowed regulatory minimum capital requirements 
covering the market risk exposures arising from banks’ trading activities to be 
based on banks’ own internal risk measurement models. Although this move was 
widely supported by both regulators and the banking industry at the time, whether 
such broad-based support will survive the current financial crisis, which many 
blame on faulty market and credit risk modeling, remains to be seen.5 
Many researchers, including this author, have criticized enforced self-
regulatory regimes in other contexts on a variety of grounds. This is not to suggest 
that enforced self-regulation can never provide meaningful benefits. In theory, 
enforced self-regulation provides an opportunity for innovation and creativity in 
establishing workable and cost-effective solutions to the problem of operational 
risk management. Moreover, under certain conditions, this goal appears to have 
been achieved in practice by some, though far from all, enforced self-regulatory 
regimes. 
Assessing the success of enforced self-regulation, however, presents 
measurement problems, mixed empirical results, and substantial debate among 
researchers. In short, even many proponents of enforced self-regulation concede 
                                                                                                                
    5. See, e.g., Dash & Creswell, supra note 3, at 4 (reporting from anonymous 
sources that Citigroup’s risk models—like those of many other financial institutions—never 
accounted for the possibility of a steep nationwide downturn in the housing market and 
concluded that the possibility of substantial defaults on its subprime portfolio was so remote 
that it was not included in scenario analyses); Steve Lohr, Wall Street’s Extreme Sport, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at B1; Joe Nocera, Risk Management, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 2, 
2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/magazine/04risk-t.html?_r=1& 
scp=1&sq=%22joe%20nocera%22%20risk&st=cse (highlighting the debate between those 
who blame the current financial crisis on the reliance on statistical models, such as value-at-
risk (VaR), that ignore extreme tail events and those who lay the blame on human error in 
using and interpreting the models). 
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that its efficacy is highly context-dependent and influenced by a number of factors, 
including the types of incentives and penalties provided by the regulation, the 
nature of the problem it is designed to address, and the particular characteristics of 
the regulated group.6 
Leaving aside debates about enforced self-regulation’s viability in other 
contexts, I argue in this Article that operational risk management is a particularly 
poor candidate for enforced self-regulation. The nature and scarcity of some types 
of operational loss events, combined with the relatively preliminary state of 
operational risk modeling, means that the enforcement arm of this particular 
enforced self-regulatory regime is apt to be lacking. Moreover, the absence of a 
general consensus regarding operational risk definition, modeling, measurement, 
and control methods means that the Basel II Accord leaves extraordinary room for 
internal and external interest groups to construct both an interpretation of the rules 
and containment strategies that enhance their position and well-being vis-à-vis the 
banking community. These interest groups have an incentive to emphasize (or 
over-emphasize) both the extent to which operational risk falls within the domain 
of their expertise and their ability to contain it. As will be shown, lawyers, 
accountants, and risk management experts—all of whom can credibly assert some 
expertise on the topic—are the primary catalysts involved in this process.7 
Meanwhile, senior management of regulated banks have an incentive to 
signal compliance with the new capital rules, while containing costs and disrupting 
existing business practices as little as possible. As a result, the enforced self-
regulation of operational risk under Basel II presents a danger of becoming more 
cosmetic than real, while consuming more resources than necessary for sub-par 
risk management, and diverting attention and resources from more effective uses. 
Some Basel II critics go further, contending that operational risk 
regulation in any form is misguided because, in contrast to market risk, financial 
institutions have limited incentives to incur excess operational risk.8 This criticism 
is apt for many of the high-frequency, low-impact events—such as routine 
employee misconduct and error—that are included under the rubric of operational 
risk.  Financial institutions have an incentive to reduce risks of this type up to the 
point at which the costs equal the benefits, and there are no obvious indications 
that banks are not currently doing so. 
However, with respect to an important sub-category of operational risk—
rogue trading—the organizational incentives to incur risk at levels that are not 
socially optimal are similar to the incentives to incur socially suboptimal levels of 
market risk. That does not imply, however, that the existing regulatory 
mechanisms designed to control market risk can simply be transplanted to 
operational risk management. As elaborated in this Article, operational risk 
measurement and modeling is a newer field that has not yet reached the precision 
and sophistication of market risk measurement and modeling techniques, which, 
                                                                                                                
    6. See infra notes 81–85 and accompanying text (discussing the mixed 
empirical research on enforced self-regulation). 
    7. See discussion infra Part II.C.2. 
    8. See infra notes 36–40 and accompanying text (discussing this and other 
objections to any form of operational risk regulation). 
2009] RETURN OF THE ROGUE 131 
ironically, have themselves come under increasing fire as the current financial 
crisis deepens.9 It does, however, suggest that operational risk regulation primarily 
should seek to control those operational events that market forces may not and that 
pose the greatest risk of bank failure and subsequent systemic problems. In other 
words, operational risk regulation is most valuable to the extent that it successfully 
addresses the low-frequency, high-impact operational events, such as rogue 
trading, that pose the greatest threat to bank safety and soundness. 
Basel II’s many critics have proposed a variety of alternatives to the 
accord’s operational risk provisions that could prove workable in practice, 
including: the promotion of market-based alternatives such as insurance, industry 
mutuals, and alternative risk transfer mechanisms (ARTs);10 basing the operational 
risk capital charge on nonfinancial metrics;11 and foregoing a regulatory capital 
approach toward operational risk in favor of a focus on internal controls and 
regulatory supervision.12 Others have argued more generally for financial 
regulation that decreases conflicts of interest within financial firms, including 
measures designed to better align secondary management incentives with the long-
term interests of financial firms.13 Building on those proposals, I contend in this 
Article that, of the many (admittedly imperfect) regulatory options for addressing 
operational risk available to the Basel Committee, it arguably chose the worst: an 
enforced self-regulatory regime that is unlikely to substantially alter the success 
with which financial institutions manage operational risk, and that carries with it 
the threats of high costs, a false sense of security, and perverse incentives. 
Particularly with regard to the low-frequency, high-impact events that are 
the greatest operational risk concern to many, attempts at enforced self-regulation 
are unlikely to produce capital set-asides sufficient to avoid threats to bank 
                                                                                                                
    9. See Nocera, supra note 5 (discussing this debate); discussion infra Part 
II.C.1. (detailing objections to VaR and demonstrating that modeling problems and 
possibilities for error and overreliance on statistical models are much greater in the context 
of operational risk than in the context of market risk, due to data scarcity and backtesting 
difficulties). 
  10. See discussion infra Part I.C. (considering market-based solutions to 
operational risk, including insurance). 
  11. Guy Ford & Maike Sundmacher, Leading Indicators for Operational Risk: 
Case Studies in Financial Services 6–8 (draft of Nov. 2004), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=963235 (urging the consideration of non-financial indicators of 
operational risk in setting capital charges, such as the ratio of back-office to front-office 
personnel, the percentage of employee incentive-based compensation, measures of per-day 
trading activity by individual traders or groups of traders, and per-employee training 
expenditures). 
  12. See, e.g., Operational Risk Poses Challenges to Financial Institutions and 
Regulators, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, July 3, 2002, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/ 
article.cfm?articleid=582 (discussing the views of roundtable participants at the Wharton 
Financial Institutions Center that capital requirements are an ineffective mechanism for 
addressing operational risk, and that regulators would fare better by focusing on supervision 
or internal controls). 
  13. Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of 
Secondary-Management Agency Costs, 26 YALE J. ON REG. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript 
on file with author). 
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stability and soundness, for the simple reason that the financial institutions with 
the highest operational risk levels are unlikely to assess the probability of such 
events at a meaningful level. In the case of rogue trading, this is often because the 
very persons charged with assessing such risk have determined to ignore the signs 
of increasing operational risk levels in pursuit of higher profits. As a result, those 
financial institutions with the highest operational risk levels may be the ones least 
likely to credibly assess that risk and set aside adequate capital under a regime of 
enforced self-regulation. 
Although the Basel II operational risk provisions are unlikely to provide 
tangible benefits, they do pose the danger of great costs. Aside from the hard cash 
expended on Basel II compliance, which may be substantial, there is a danger that 
regulators, organizational stakeholders, and even industry participants may be 
lured into a false sense of confidence regarding operational risk levels. Moreover, 
Basel II may induce some organizations to “manage the model” in order to 
manipulate operational risk capital measures, rather than manage operational risk 
itself. Finally, the incentives fostered by Basel II to produce a numerical measure 
of operational risk may divert attention toward the high-frequency, low-impact 
events that are most easily quantified, and away from the more challenging aspects 
of operational risk, such as rogue trading, that may pose the greater threat to 
financial institution soundness and stability. 
With Basel II, the international banking community had an opportunity to 
make real, if tentative, inroads toward controlling operational risk. By proceeding 
incrementally, the Basel Committee could have adopted a workable, cost-effective, 
and politically feasible approach to operational risk management with a relatively 
minimal disruption to the existing regulatory structure in most major banking 
countries. For example, by mandating the current “strongly encouraged” practice 
within the United States of two-week employee vacations,14 and dedicating more 
resources to bank examinations specifically focused on potential sources of 
operational risk—such as quickly growing operations, earnings stemming from 
improbable sources, back and middle office issues, and follow-ups to concerns 
previously identified by regulators and exchanges15—Basel could take some 
preliminary steps toward meaningfully addressing operational risk concerns. 
If the markets for operational risk insurance and ARTs continue to 
develop, future regulatory steps could include further incentivizing their use.16 
Finally, although more empirical study is needed to fully identify the extent to 
which nonfinancial metrics are reliable indicators of operational risks, measures 
such as the ratio of back- to front-office personnel, the percentage of employee 
incentive-based compensation, and per-day trading activity measures may prove 
                                                                                                                
  14. See infra notes 235–37 and accompanying text (discussing the “strongly 
encouraged” two-week vacation rule). 
  15. See discussion infra Part III (elaborating on the role of each of these factors 
in large rogue trading incidents). 
  16. Banks using the AMA are currently allowed to mitigate their operational risk 
capital charge by up to 20% through insurance. See infra note 56 and accompanying text. 
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more reliable at predicting operational risk and resulting standards of capital 
adequacy than financial metrics derived through enforced self-regulation.17 
Part I of this Article defines operational risk, distinguishing between two 
very different types: high-frequency, low-impact events, such as “fat fingers” 
errors, and low-frequency, high-impact (sometimes referred to as “tail”) events, 
such as rogue trading, terrorism, and natural disaster. Part I also notes that the bulk 
of the criticisms leveled against the Basel II operational risk provisions, including 
the criticisms in this Article, apply primarily to tail events—the second category of 
operational risk. Part II examines the operational risk provisions of Basel II as a 
species of enforced self-regulation, briefly reviewing the literature on its 
effectiveness and contending that, regardless of one’s opinions on the efficacy of 
enforced self-regulatory regimes in other contexts, operational risk is an especially 
poor candidate for enforced self-regulation. 
Part III employs several recent and well-known rogue trading cases, with 
a particular focus on Jerome Kerviel at Société Générale, to illustrate a central 
point of this Article: prior to the pubic revelation of their massive rogue trading 
losses, it is highly unlikely that any of these institutions would have set aside 
meaningful capital to account for the risk of significant losses from unauthorized 
trades, because each had determined to ignore numerous warning signs of 
increasing operational risk levels. The Article concludes that, although it is too 
early to fully evaluate the effects of Basel II, which began a phased-in 
implementation in the United States on January 1, 2009, there are many reasons to 
doubt its ability to successfully control banks’ operational risk levels in a cost-
effective manner.18 
I. DEFINING OPERATIONAL RISK 
A. Operational Risk Generally 
The concept of operational risk did not formally make its way into 
international banking standards until the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
adopted the second Basel Accord, known as “Basel II.” The BIS, headquartered in 
Basel, Switzerland, is the international regulatory body for the world banking 
system.19 Originally created in 1930 to manage Germany’s reparations payments 
under the Treaty of Versailles, the primary modern role of the BIS is to promote 
                                                                                                                
  17. See Ford & Sundmacher, supra note 11, at 6–8 (discussing some of these 
possibilities). 
  18. Basel II has been met with unexpected controversy and delay in the United 
States, only some of which is related to the operational risk provisions. As a result, the 
anticipated start date has been moved back several times, and the United States lags behind 
other advanced banking countries in terms of Basel II implementation progress. Richard J. 
Herring, The Rocky Road to Implementation of Basel II in the United States, 35 ATLANTIC 
ECON. J. 411, 427 (2007); David Keefe, U.S. Core Banks Starting Basel II Tests by April 
Deadline, GLOBAL RISK REGULATOR, Oct. 2008, available at http:// 
www.globalriskregulator.com/article.php?pgkey=1873. 
  19. Jeffry M. Netter & Annette B. Poulsen, Operational Risk in Financial 
Service Providers and the Proposed Basel Capital Accord: An Overview 2 (2003) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
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cooperation among the world’s leading central banks and banking regulators, with 
the goal of promoting bank stability and soundness internationally.20 The Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision was established in 1974 as a subcommittee of 
BIS, with the goal of harmonizing bank supervisory standards internationally.21 
The Committee’s recommendations are separately enacted into domestic law by 
each member country.22 
The Basel Accord of 1988 (“Basel I”), which the United States 
implemented in 1991 through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act, defined for the first time international standards regarding risk-
based capital requirements for banks.23 In response to a variety of perceived 
problems with Basel I, however, the Basel Committee set out to revise it, leading 
to Basel II and the resulting inclusion of operational risk in bank capital 
requirements.24  
Basel II defines operational risk as the “risk of loss resulting from 
inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external 
events.”25 The definition specifically includes legal risk and specifically excludes 
strategic and reputational risk.26 In addition to rogue traders, brokers, and other 
employees, therefore, operational risk encompasses such varied hazards as losses 
associated with the theft or loss of sensitive customer data; software or hardware 
failures that disrupt normal business operations; settlement errors; damages 
awarded in court proceedings; penalties and fines imposed by member associations 
or regulatory bodies; and losses caused by natural or unnatural disasters, such as a 
terrorist attack, flood, or earthquake.27 
Operational risk can be roughly divided into two very different categories 
of risk events. First are the high-frequency, low-impact events that plague the daily 
life of all business enterprises, including banks. For example, computers will 
crash, employees will slip and fall, and traders, brokers, and back-office personnel 
                                                                                                                
  20. Id. For more on the BIS and Basel, see generally DANIEL K. TARULLO, 
BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION (2008). 
  21. Maike Sundmacher, Operational Risk Capital Charges for Banks: 
Consideration and Consequences 3 (May 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=963227. 
  22. Netter & Poulsen, supra note 19, at 2–3. 
  23. Id. at 3–5. Basel I linked bank capital requirements to measures of the 
riskiness of a firm’s financial assets. Id. 
  24. Id. (discussing at greater length the criticisms of Basel I and the resulting 
push to revise it). 
  25. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF 
CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK—
COMPREHENSIVE VERSION 144 (2006) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE], 
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.htm. 
  26. Id. The Accord specifies that “legal risk includes, but is not limited to, 
exposure to fines, penalties, or punitive damages resulting from supervisory actions, as well 
as private settlements.” Id. at n.97. 
  27. Carolyn Currie, The Potential Effect of the New Basel Operational Risk  
Capital Requirements 6 (Univ. of Tech. Sydney Sch. of Fin. & Econ. Working Paper No. 
137, 2004), available at http://www.business.uts.edu.au/finance/research/wpapers/ 
wp137.pdf; Netter & Poulsen, supra note 19, at 7–8. 
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will have what are sometimes referred to as “fat fingers” errors. That is, they will 
make honest and routine mistakes, such as hitting the wrong key during data entry 
or writing down an incorrect price in recording a trade or sale. As a general rule, 
these events are not significantly problematic for most institutions.28 
In the second category are the low-frequency, high-impact events that 
spark much of the controversy surrounding operational risk regulation. Included in 
this category are high-level employee misconduct and fraud (including rogue 
traders and rogue brokers) and devastating natural or other disasters outside of a 
firm’s control (such as the 2001 World Trade Center attacks or earthquakes and 
tropical storms that hit a financial center). As elaborated in Part II.C.1., below, the 
bulk of the criticism leveled against the Basel II operational risk provisions are 
directed at this second category of events. 
Historically, one might say that operational risk has been the black sheep 
of the risk management industry. Traditionally a residual category of risk, anything 
not classified as credit or market risk was considered operational risk.29 In fact, 
operational risk was not even mentioned in the Basel Accord of 1988, which first 
defined international risk-based capital standards for banks.30 Nor was operational 
risk included in the 1996 amendment to Basel I, which expanded the risk-based 
capital requirements beyond credit risk (the focus of the 1988 Accord) to include 
the market risk of trading activities.31 
This does not mean that operational risk did not exist prior to Basel II, or 
that banks and other financial institutions did not take measures to contain and 
control that risk. Indeed, the Committee explicitly recognized that financial 
institutions had already begun to treat operational risk as a serious category of 
potential loss, integrating the concept into their internal capital assessment and 
                                                                                                                
  28. Recently, however, there have been examples of relatively large errors in this 
category. For example, in late 2005, a trader at Mizuho Financial Group, the securities arm 
of Japan’s second largest bank, incorrectly passed on to the Tokyo Stock Exchange a 
customer order to sell one share of stock at JPY 610,000 as an order to sell 610,000 shares 
of stock at one yen. Mizuho had to buy back all of the shares it had mistakenly sold short, 
losing $350 million on the trade. Morgan Stanley Fined $300,000 for $10.8 Billion Trade 
Mistake, Toomre Capital Markets LLC, available at http://www.toomre.com/ 
Morgan_Stanley_Fined. Similarly, in 2004, a Morgan Stanley employee incorrectly 
calculated and entered an order to buy a basket of shares valued at $10.8 billion, instead of 
the $10.8 million needed to hedge an outstanding position. Although the error was quickly 
caught and the order cancelled, the New York Stock Exchange fined Morgan Stanley 
$300,000, citing insufficient internal controls. Id. The difference between these events and 
those in category two, as shown by these examples, is that because the error is 
unintentional, it typically is reported or caught—and thus corrected—right away, limiting 
losses to a manageable amount. 
  29. Credit risk is the risk of loss due to counterparty default. Market risk is the 
risk of loss due to changes in asset prices. 
  30. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE 
OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (1988), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.pdf?noframes=1. 
  31. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, AMENDMENT TO THE CAPITAL 
ACCORD TO INCORPORATE MARKET RISKS 1 (1996) [hereinafter AMENDMENT TO THE 
CAPITAL ACCORD], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs24.pdf. 
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allocation decisions.32 But the notion of operational risk as a separate risk 
category, amenable to data collection, modeling, and quantification is a relatively 
new one spurred by a variety of factors, including Basel II’s mandate that banks 
set aside adequate capital to weather anticipated operational losses. 
The impetus behind the inclusion of operational risk in the Basel II 
Accord appears to be a perception of rising operational risk levels within banking 
institutions. In part, that perception is attributable to high-profile operational risk 
losses, such as the Nick Leeson rogue trading scandal at Barings Bank and the  
World Trade Center attacks, both of which focused attention on the possibility of 
ruinous operational losses.33  
However, business developments in the banking community with the 
capacity to increase operational risk also prompted more industry and regulatory 
concern. For example, the growing number of large-scale bank mergers stressed 
newly integrated systems; banks increasingly became high-volume service 
providers; the growing use by banks of financial products, such as derivatives, 
designed to reduce market or credit risk increased operational risk; and banks 
increased their volume of e-commerce, automated technology, and outsourcing.34 
Finally, developments related to modeling the types of low-frequency events 
characteristic of some types of operational risk enabled advances in operational 
risk quantification that spurred some institutions to attempt to account for 
operational risk in a more systematic manner.35 
Despite these developments, some observers contend that operational risk 
regulation in any form is misguided. First, some have argued that, unlike more 
traditional risk categories such as market risk, increases in operational risk do not 
increase profit potential.36 As a result, there is no incentive for banks to increase 
operational risk in pursuit of higher profits, making operational risk regulation 
unnecessary. It is true that the institutional calculation regarding optimal risk levels 
is somewhat different for operational risk than is the case with more traditional 
risk categories, such as market risk. The incentive for banks to incur excessive 
                                                                                                                
  32. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, WORKING PAPER ON THE 
REGULATORY TREATMENT OF OPERATIONAL RISK 1 (2001), available at http://www.bis.org/ 
publ/bcbs_wp8.pdf. 
  33. Douglas G. Hoffman, MANAGING OPERATIONAL RISK xxv (2002) (attributing 
regulatory and financial firms’ interest in operational risk to the Nick Leeson and World 
Trade Center incidents). 
  34. Id. 
  35. See, e.g., Volker Jentsch et al., Extreme Events: Magic, Mysteries, and 
Challenges, in EXTREME EVENTS IN NATURE AND SOCIETY 1, 8–9 (Volker Jentsch et al. eds., 
2006); Laurens de Haan & Ana Ferreira, EXTREME VALUE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION vii 
(2006) (discussing advances in extreme value theory as a means of modeling the probability 
of infrequent events); Kay Giesecke, et al., Measuring the Risk of Extreme Events (2005), 
available at http://www.mathematik.uni-leipzig.de/~tschmidt/gsw2005RiskofExtreme 
Events.pdf; see also sources cited infra note 42. 
  36.  See, e.g., Michel Crouhy et al., Insuring Versus Self-Insuring Operational 
Risk: Viewpoints of Depositors and Shareholders, 12 J. OF DERIVATIVES 51, 51 (2004); J. 
David Cummins & Paul Embrechts, Introduction: Special Section on Operational Risk, 30 
J. BANKING & FIN. 2599, 2600 (2006). 
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market risk is obvious: the potential for higher returns. In contrast, there are no 
obvious benefits to banks from increasing the risk that employees will steal or that 
systems will crash. In theory, at least, banks should reduce these risks up to the 
point where costs equal benefits. 
I argue in this Article, however, that this assumption is flawed for a very 
important sub-category of operational risk: rogue trading. Banks may very well 
have an incentive to incur rogue trading risk at levels that are not socially optimal. 
A variety of theories (and some limited empirical evidence) suggest that the same 
factors that increase the probability of rogue trading may also create more 
profitable traders.37 As a result, there is likely a mismatch between organizational 
incentives and the socially optimal level of operational risk within banking 
institutions. Moreover, to the extent that unauthorized trading activity may 
function at some firms as a means to provide plausible deniability while avoiding 
increased regulatory minimum capital requirements stemming from excessive 
market risk or position sizes, then the organizational incentives to incur rogue 
trading risk are similar to the incentives to incur market risk.38 
Second, it is sometimes argued that operational risk is highly context- 
dependent and driven by forces unique to each institution. As a result, operational 
risk is diversifiable.39 Moreover, banks that manage operational risk most poorly 
will be punished, and eventually eliminated, by the marketplace. The market is 
thus self-correcting so far as operational risk is concerned, obviating the need for 
regulatory intervention. Although the true causes of and potential for contagion 
effects stemming from individual bank failure are debatable,40 the prospect of bank 
failure as a disciplining mechanism naturally takes on a very different significance 
in today’s atmosphere of market crisis, massive bank bailouts, and potential 
nationalizations than might have been the case even a few years ago. Recent events 
have starkly demonstrated both the ability and willingness of banking institutions 
to incur dangerous risk levels and the inability of governments to simply stand by 
as passive observers when those risk appetites lead to bank collapse, at least when 
such collapse occurs on a broad scale or at institutions considered too big to fail. 
For these reasons, this Article does not question the basic premise of operational 
risk regulation, concluding instead that the particular method employed to combat 
                                                                                                                
  37. See infra notes 138–46 (discussing this research in greater detail). 
  38. See discussion infra Part III (exploring this possibility in the context of 
several specific rogue trading incidents). 
  39. J. David Cummins et al., The Market Value Impact of Operational Loss 
Events for U.S. Banks and Insurers, 30 J. BANKING & FIN. 2605, 2610 (2006) (stating that 
some opponents of regulating operational risk take the position that it is idiosyncratic 
“earnings ‘noise’ that can be diversified away by shareholders”); Measuring Operational 
Risk: A Reality Check, RISK, Sept. 2003, http://www.risk.net/public/ 
showPage.html?page=17969. 
  40. Olivier De Bandt & Philipp Hartmann, Systemic Risk: A Survey, pt. 4 
(European Central Bank Working Paper No. 35, Nov. 2000) (defining and discussing 
contagion effects, the limited empirical research regarding its existence in most markets, 
and the difficulty of developing empirical tests that can make a clear distinction between 
pure contagion and crises caused by common shocks or rational revisions of depositor or 
investor expectations when information is asymmetric). 
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excessive operational risk is likely to be both ineffective and unworkable, and that 
Basel had at its disposal better options for regulating operational risk. 
B. The Three Measurement Approaches 
Including an operational risk measure in banks’ capital charges was not 
without challenges for the Basel Committee. Unlike market and credit risk, which 
had been measured and quantified for some time, and for which sophisticated 
models and relatively extensive data had been developed,41 operational risk 
measurement was—and, indeed, still is—in its infancy.42 As stated by the Basel 
Committee: 
 Approaches to the measurement of operational risk 
continue to evolve rapidly, but are unlikely to attain the precision 
with which market and credit risk can be quantified. This poses 
obvious challenges to the incorporation of a measure of operational 
risk within the minimum capital requirement.43 
Recognizing the challenge associated with operational risk quantification, 
the Basel Committee adopted three different measurement approaches that 
represent a sliding scale of trade-offs between complexity and flexibility. Under 
the AMA, banks use their own risk metrics for calculating the operational risk 
capital requirement, including loss data, scenario analysis, and risk mitigation 
measures.44 Although the AMA is the most complex measure of the three, it also 
provides the greatest flexibility. As stated by the Basel Committee: 
 On the other hand, the Committee is prepared to allow an 
unprecedented amount of flexibility to banks in choosing how to 
measure operational risk and the resulting capital requirement. 
Under the [AMA], banks will be permitted to choose their own 
methodology for assessing operational risk, so long as it is 
sufficiently comprehensive and systematic. The extent of detailed 
standards and criteria for use of the AMA are minimal in an effort 
to spur the development of innovative approaches, although the 
                                                                                                                
  41. Ironically, the recent financial crisis has starkly demonstrated the 
shortcomings in financial institutions’ attempts to quantify and control even the traditional 
risk categories of market and credit risk. 
  42. This is not to deny the many advances in operational risk quantification that 
have occurred in recent years. See, e.g., V. Chavez-Demoulin et al., Quantitative Models for 
Operational Risk: Extremes, Dependence and Aggregation, 30 J. BANKING & FIN. 2635, 
2636 (2006) (discussing quantitative advances relevant to operational risk measurement, 
including Extreme Value Theory and dependence modeling); J. David Cummins & Paul 
Embrechts, Introduction: Special Section on Operational Risk, 30 J. BANKING & FIN. 2599 
(2006) (reviewing recent work on operational risk modeling). As discussed below, however, 
operational risk modeling and measurement continues to present many challenges. See 
discussion infra Part II.C.1. 
  43. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, OVERVIEW PAPER FOR THE IMPACT 
STUDY 7, ¶ 43 (2002). 
  44. Netter & Poulsen, supra note 19, at 18–19. 
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Committee intends to review progress in regard to operational risk 
approaches on an ongoing basis.45 
Use of the AMA is subject to supervisory approval and is conditioned 
upon the bank meeting a variety of qualitative and quantitative factors.46 In the 
United States, banking institutions and bank holding companies with more than 
$250 billion in total consolidated assets or with foreign exposures greater than $10 
billion are required to use the AMA, while others meeting certain qualifications 
can opt to use it.47 
Providing less flexibility is the Standardized Approach (TSA), available 
to banks meeting certain qualitative criteria. Under TSA, different business lines 
are assigned individual gross activity measures, which are then multiplied by a 
fixed multiple (or “beta”), ranging from 0.12 to 0.18, determined by the 
regulator.48 Finally, the Basic Indicator Approach (BIA) is a default approach, 
designed for banks that do not qualify to use one of the more sophisticated 
approaches. Under the BIA, the required minimum regulatory capital is equal to a 
fixed multiple (0.15) of gross income. Although the BIA is thus the simplest of the 
three measures, it is also the least sensitive and is intended to result in the most 
onerous capital charge.49 According to the Basel Committee, “[i]nternationally 
active banks and banks with significant operational risk exposures (for example, 
specialized processing banks) are expected to use an approach that is more 
sophisticated than the Basic Indicator Approach and that is appropriate for the risk 
profile of the institution.”50 
While the AMA thus relies on internally generated data, models, and 
methodologies, the BIA and TSA capital requirements are determined exclusively 
by regulatory authorities. The assumption behind this multi-tiered approach is that 
banks will incur a lower capital charge as they move across the spectrum of 
measurement approaches from less sophisticated to more sophisticated. Banks thus 
should incur the highest capital charge under the BIA, a lower charge under TSA, 
and the lowest of all under the AMA. The rationale behind this menu of choices is 
that institutions will seek to improve their risk management systems and 
procedures in the hopes of qualifying for a more flexible approach that reduces the 
required capital charge. The resulting assumption is that banks will have an 
                                                                                                                
  45. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 43, at 7–8, para. 44 
(emphases added). 
  46. INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE, supra note 25, at 149–52. 
  47. See FED. RESERVE BD., JOINT FINAL RULE AND SUPPORTING BOARD 
DOCUMENTS: RISK-BASED CAPITAL STANDARDS: ADVANCED CAPITAL ADEQUACY 
FRAMEWORK–BASEL II 661 (2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/ 
Basel2/FinalRule_BaselII/TechnicalOverview.pdf. As of March 31, 2008, about a dozen 
U.S. banks would have been required to use the AMA under these standards. See Bank and 
Thrift Holding Companies with the Most Assets, AM. BANKER, July 23, 2008, available at 
http://www.americanbanker.com/ranking-the-banks.html. Since that time, however, the 
industry has experienced significant change and is likely to continue to do so. 
  48. INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE, supra note 25, at 146–47. 
  49. Id. at 144–45. 
  50. Id. at 144. 
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incentive to incur the charges to move from the BIA to TSA, and then, if the size 
and type of their operations warrant it, to the AMA.51  
Some researchers, however, have demonstrated that this assumption is 
flawed under certain conditions. For example, if a bank generates the bulk of its 
revenue in a high-beta business, then its capital charge could increase by moving 
from the BIA to the more fine-grained measures of TSA. For such a bank, there is 
no regulatory incentive to improve internal operational risk controls.52 
Moreover, although this Article’s focus is a critique of Basel II as a 
species of enforced self-regulation (and, therefore, specifically a critique of the 
AMA), it is worth noting that some researchers have criticized the BIA and TSA 
as similarly unworkable, ineffective, and creating potentially perverse incentives. 
For example, some argue that the TSA may incentivize banks to shift resources 
from high-beta business lines to low-beta lines, in an attempt to reduce their capital 
charge.53 In addition, it has been demonstrated that under the BIA, the regulatory 
minimum operational risk capital for National Australia Bank (NAB) would have 
steadily decreased from 2001 to 2004—a time period during which a group of 
rogue traders lost $360 million in foreign exchange trading. As a result, not only 
would NAB’s operational capital charge have been at its lowest in 2004, when the 
rogue trading losses were discovered, but the steady decrease in the capital charge 
over time would have given the false impression that operational risk was 
decreasing, creating a false sense of security.54 Similarly, researchers have shown 
that neither the BIA nor TSA would have captured the true risk levels of John 
Rusnak’s unauthorized trading activity at Allied Irish Bank (AIB), because the net 
income from trading operations increased by only a small percentage during the 
relevant time frame.55 
C.  Insurance and Other Market-Based Solutions 
At present, all market-based solutions to operational risk management 
appear imperfect. These solutions (or, more accurately, potential future solutions) 
include insurance, industry mutuals, and specialized bonds.  
Banks using the AMA are allowed to mitigate their operational risk 
capital charge through insurance by up to 20% of the total amount calculated under 
the AMA.56 However, many operational risk events are either uninsurable or only 
partially insurable, and there appears to be undercoverage even in those areas 
                                                                                                                
  51. Maike Sundmacher, The Basic Indicator Approach and the Standardised 
Approach to Operational Risk: An Example- and Case Study-Based Analysis 4–5 (2007), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=988282. 
  52. Id. at 4–5. 
  53. Id. 
  54. Id. at 10; see also infra notes 189–232 and accompanying text (discussing 
the NAB affair in greater detail). 
  55. Sundmacher, supra note 21, at 19; see also infra notes 193–207 and 
accompanying text (discussing the Rusnak/AIB case). 
  56. INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE, supra note 25, at 155. Basel imposes certain 
further restrictions relating to the quality of the insurer and the specific policy provisions. 
Id. 
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(such as rogue trading) where policies are available.57 This lack of coverage has 
been attributed to a variety of causes, including high premiums, high deductibles, 
low coverage limits, the uncertainty and delay associated with insurance payouts, 
and an unwillingness on the part of financial institutions to concede that their 
internal controls may be inadequate to deter rogue employees.58 Moreover, some 
critics argue that insurance is an opaque and inefficient mechanism for pricing 
operational risk.59 
To illustrate, it is unlikely that Société Générale will be able to claim on 
its insurance policy for Jerome Kerviel’s $7 billion rogue trading loss. Like most 
institutions, Société Générale has a fidelity bond that covers the firm against losses 
arising from employee fraud undertaken for personal gain.60 As with most rogue 
traders, however, Kerviel undertook his unauthorized activity for the purpose of 
increasing the bank’s trading profits (although his actions also increased his yearly 
bonus). His losses, therefore, are likely excluded from coverage under such a 
policy. Nick Leeson’s losses at Barings were excluded from coverage for the same 
reason.61 
Rogue trading insurance policies do exist, having been first introduced by 
Lloyd’s shortly after the Nick Leeson scandal at Barings. Like many firms, 
however, Société Générale reportedly does not have such coverage.62 In any event, 
such policies typically offer only about GBP 200 million of coverage—an amount 
insufficient to cover the most serious rogue trading losses and too small to make 
even a dent in Kerviel’s massive losses.63 Reports are mixed on whether the 
Société Générale affair is likely to advance or stifle the operational risk insurance 
                                                                                                                
  57. Netter & Poulsen, supra note 19, at 15, 26 n.4 (reporting that in a recent 
survey of fifty-five financial institutions by the RMA, International Swaps & Derivatives 
Association, and British Bankers’ Association, the respondents reported insurance recovery 
in 12.2% of all operational loss events, including 36.1% of the highest magnitude loss 
events, and that when recovery occurred it averaged 81.6% of the total loss). 
  58. Adrian Ladbury, SocGen Affair Ups Demand for ‘Rogue Trader’ Coverage, 
BUSINESS INSURANCE, Feb. 11, 2008, available at http://www.businessinsurance.com/cgi-
bin/article.pl?articleId=24039; Lloyds, Société Générale, Rogue Trading, and a Little 
Solution Called Insurance, Jan. 29, 2008, http://www.lloyds.com/News_Centre/ 
Features_from_Lloyds/Societe_Generale_rogue_trading_and_a_little_solution_called_ 
insurance_29012008.htm; Operational Risk, AMBIT ERISK, http://www.erisk.com/Learning/ 
JigSaw/OperationalRisk.asp (last visited Jan. 11, 2009). 
  59. See, e.g., Michel Crouhy et al., Insuring Versus Self-Insuring Operational 
Risk: Viewpoints of Depositors and Shareholders, 12 J. OF DERIVATIVES 51, 54 (Winter 
2004) (formally demonstrating that the question of when to insure against operational risk 
losses is a complex one, determined by a number of factors including the bank’s capital 
structure, the type of loss in question, the expected return on assets, and the risk neutral 
probability of the operational risk event); Operational Risk, supra note 58. 
  60. Lloyds, supra note 58. In addition, many firms have personal indemnity 
coverage with a dishonesty extension that covers losses of client funds arising out of 
employee dishonesty. Id. Most rogue traders, however, lose money on proprietary trading. 
  61. Id. 
  62. Id. 
  63. Id.; Ladbury, supra note 58. 
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market, with some sources predicting increased demand and others predicting 
more caution by insurers in their willingness to write such policies.64 
Although some industry observers hold out hope that an industry mutual 
or collective of some sort could improve on the shortcomings of traditional 
insurance, the advantages and disadvantages of this possibility have been seriously 
debated for over a decade, without sufficient interest by major global financial 
institutions to render the solution viable.65 Impediments to an industry mutual 
include concerns regarding confidentiality and the risk profiles of other 
institutions, as well as an unwillingness to fund competitors’ losses.66 Most believe 
that the Société Générale crisis will only compound these fears, leaving “not a 
hope” for the possibility of an industry mutual in the near future.67 
Finally, there is increasing optimism in some quarters regarding 
Alternative Risk Transfer mechanisms (ARTs) for operational risk, although such 
products currently exist only in concept.68 Operational risk ARTs would likely 
resemble a catastrophe bond, issued by individual financial institutions and paying 
an above-market interest rate. In the event of a defined operational event, interest 
payments would cease.69 Although much work is still needed to make this concept 
a reality, the irony that the same complex financial products contributing to 
operational risk growth may provide its means of containment is not lost on some 
industry observers.70 
II. OPERATIONAL RISK AS ENFORCED SELF-REGULATION 
With the inclusion of operational risk measures, particularly the AMA, 
into banks’ capital charges, the international banking community moved squarely 
into the realm of enforced self-regulation, a type of responsive regulation. Section 
A of this Part briefly describes enforced self-regulation, comparing it to and 
distinguishing it from other brands of responsive regulation. Section B offers a 
critique of enforced self-regulation, reviewing recent empirical work in the area. 
Section C argues that operational risk is a particularly poor candidate for enforced 
self-regulation. 
A. Responsive and Enforced Self-Regulation 
Sometimes referred to as “negotiated governance,” “tit for tat regulation,” 
or “collaborative governance,” responsive regulation seeks to improve the 
regulatory process by providing a greater governance role to the regulated group 
                                                                                                                
  64. Compare Lloyds, supra note 58 (predicting greater demand), with Ladbury, 
supra note 58 (predicting greater caution among insurers); Lloyd’s on Rogue Traders, INS. J. 
(July 1, 2008) (quoting Daniel Butler, Executive Director at Aon, as stating, “[w]e have had 
a handful of inquiries about coverage for unauthorized trading events but we haven’t seen a 
huge surge in demand since SocGen”). 
  65. Ladbury, supra note 58. 
  66. Id. 
  67. Id. 
  68. Operational Risk, supra note 58. 
  69. Id. 
  70. Id. 
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and, sometimes, other interested parties.71 In doing so, responsive regulation aims 
to transcend the long-standing regulation versus deregulation debate. As 
articulated by Professors Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite: 
By credibly asserting a willingness to regulate more intrusively, 
responsive regulation can channel marketplace transactions to less 
intrusive and less centralized forms of government intervention. 
Escalating forms of responsive regulation can thereby retain many 
of the benefits of laissez-faire governance without abdicating 
government’s responsibility to correct market failure.72 
To accomplish this objective, Ayres and Braithwaite propose a pyramid 
regulatory structure, under which the base of the pyramid—that is, the bulk of the 
regulatory action—consists of industry self-regulation. The next block of the 
pyramid is dedicated to enforced self-regulation, followed by command and 
control regulation with discretionary punishment, and finally at the top of the 
pyramid (representing the smallest portion of regulatory activity) is command 
regulation with non-discretionary punishment.73 Although the Ayres and 
Braithwaite articulation of responsive regulation is the best-known and most 
influential, the literature on responsive regulation and its many variations is vast, 
nuanced, and spans numerous fields, including law, management and 
environmental sciences, political science, and sociology.74 
Under enforced self-regulation, the state works with individual firms to 
establish regulations (such as the operational risk capital charge under the AMA) 
that are specifically designed for that firm.75 In order to avoid more severe and less 
tailored regulations imposed by the state (such as the BIA and TSA under Basel 
II), each firm must propose its own regulatory standards.76 Those standards are 
then enforced primarily within the firm itself, through the establishment of an 
independent internal compliance group. The state’s primary role in enforcement 
involves ensuring that the internal compliance group remains independent, and 
conducting audits to ensure that it performs its assigned compliance task.77 Internal 
compliance, with the threat of escalating state involvement as a backup, thus lies at 
the heart of the enforced self-regulation paradigm. As described by Professors 
Ayres and Braithwaite: 
 
                                                                                                                
  71. See generally IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: 
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992); see also ROBERT A. KAGAN, 
ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 241 (2003).  
  72. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 71, at 4–5. 
  73. Id. at 38–39. 
  74. See, e.g., Vibeke Lehmann Nielson & Christine Parker, Testing Responsive 
Regulation in Regulatory Enforcement 2–3 (2008) (manuscript on file with author) 
(reviewing some of this literature); ROBERT BALDWIN & MARTIN CAVE, UNDERSTANDING 
REGULATION: THEORY, STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE 39–41, 99–101 (1999) (same). 
  75. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 71, at 101. This is distinguished from 
industry co-regulation, under which industry associations self-regulate, with some 
government oversight and enforcement. Id. at 102. 
  76. Id. 
  77. Id. at 106. 
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[E]nforced self-regulation envisions that in particular contexts it will 
be more efficacious for the regulated firms to take on some or all of 
the legislative, executive, and judicial regulatory functions. As self-
regulating legislators, firms would devise their own regulatory rules; 
as self-regulating executives, firms would monitor themselves for 
noncompliance; and as self-regulating judges, firms would punish 
and correct episodes of noncompliance.78 
The goal of this more collaborative and less authoritative regulatory approach 
is to foster more efficient, effective regulation through greater involvement in the 
governance process by a variety of interested groups, including the regulated 
group. Theories of enforced self-regulation have influenced a wide range of U.S. 
legal regimes in recent decades, including environmental, tort, securities, 
employment discrimination, corporate, organizational sentencing, and health care 
law.79 
 
Ayres and Braithwaite are careful to note, however, that the state’s continuing 
readiness to impose harsher sanctions is a critical element to the success of 
enforced self-regulation. The retention of public enforcement, in the form of 
detecting and punishing deviations of these privately written conduct codes, is thus 
essential to effectively achieving the goals of enforced self-regulation.80 
B. The Enforced Self-Regulation Critique 
Many, including this author, have criticized enforced self-regulation or 
similar internal compliance-based regulatory or liability mitigation schemes in 
other contexts on a variety of grounds. First, as an empirical matter, enforced self-
regulation and its internal compliance-based brethren fare poorly in many 
studies.81 Although some studies suggest positive effects from such measures,82 
                                                                                                                
  78. Id. at 103. 
  79. See generally Lawrence A. Cunnigham, The Appeal and Limits of Internal 
Controls to Fight Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 J. CORP. L. 267 (2004) (discussing this 
trend); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated 
Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 487 (2003) (same); John S. Moot, Compliance 
Programs, Penalty Mitigation and the FERC, 29 ENERGY L.J. 547, 559–67 (2008) 
(discussing recent developments in compliance-based regulation and mitigation measures 
by the DOJ, SEC, EPA, and FERC). 
  80. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 71, at 103. 
  81. See, e.g., Krawiec, supra note 79, at 511–16 (summarizing some of this 
research); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the Principal-Agent 
Model, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 571, 596 (2005) (same); Christine Parker & Vibeke Lehmann 
Nielsen, Corporate Compliance Systems: Could They Make Any Difference?, ADMIN. & 
SOC’Y, Dec. 2008, at 1, 4–7 (same). 
  82. See, e.g., Lori Snyder Bennear, Evaluating Management-Based Regulation: 
A Valuable Tool in the Regulatory Toolbox?, in LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR: 
MANAGEMENT-BASED STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING PRIVATE SECTOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
PERFORMANCE 51–86 (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2006) (finding significant 
reductions in toxic chemical levels at plants subject to mandated pollution prevention 
planning as compared to plants not subject to such laws); Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, 
Management-Based Strategies: An Emerging Approach to Environmental Protection, in 
LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR 3 (reviewing a variety of studies on the effectiveness of 
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others find only minimal, mixed, or no effects.83 Moreover, even many studies 
establishing a correlation between enforced self-regulation or internal compliance-
based regimes and the behavior to be controlled are unable to conclude whether 
the internal compliance measures themselves, as opposed to some other factor 
(such as managerial commitment to improvement or increased regulator or third 
party scrutiny), drive the outcome.84 Although this empirical literature is too 
voluminous, nuanced, and complex to fully elucidate here, one can conclude from 
this body of work that even many advocates of enforced self-regulation concede 
that its effectiveness is context-dependent and determined by any number of 
factors, including the incentives and penalties provided by the regulation, the 
nature of the problem the regulation seeks to address, and the characteristics of 
individual regulated firms, such as senior management’s commitment to 
improvement.85 
Second, as elaborated below, enforced self-regulation can be very 
expensive. For example, both the Clean Air Act and section 404 of the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes–Oxley), each of which contains substantial enforced 
                                                                                                                
management-based measures, many of which found significant, positive results); Parker & 
Nielsen, supra note 81, at 3 (studying 999 larger businesses in Australia and finding that 
“the compliance management system structures promoted by regulators are one important 
influence on compliance management in practice, but not the only one”). 
  83. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: 
Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 L. & SOC’Y REV. 691, 696–
700 (2003) (reviewing the empirical evidence on the success of management-based 
regulation in connection with food safety, chemical accident regulation, and pollution 
prevention and finding some indications of the success of management-based approaches, 
but other evidence that the regulations, at least as operationalized, are not working as 
predicted); Robert A. Kagan, Environmental Management Style and Corporate 
Environmental Performance, in LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR, supra note 82, at 31, 
31–48 (reporting on a study of fourteen pulp mills in Australia, New Zealand, British 
Columbia, and the United States, and determining that “over time, the largest gains in 
environmental performance in the industry have stemmed not from enlightened corporate 
management per se but from periodic tightening of environmental standards mandated by 
governments”); Alexandra Kalev et al., Best Practices or Best Guesses? Diversity 
Management and the Remediation of Inequality, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 589, 611 (2006) (using 
federal data and survey data covering 708 private sector establishments from 1971 to 2002 
and finding that diversity training and diversity evaluations have no impact on levels of 
female and minority representation in management; mentoring and networking programs 
show modest effects; and affirmative action plans, diversity committees, and diversity staff 
show positive effects); Parker & Nielsen, supra note 81, at 3 (concluding that “good 
management and good values are likely to be more important than formal systems at 
influencing compliance management in practice and, ultimately, actual compliance”). 
  84. Cf. Kagan supra note 83, at 42–43 (attributing improvements associated with 
management-based measures primarily to tighter environmental standards and individual 
management commitment, rather than primarily to the measures themselves); Parker & 
Nielsen, supra note 81, at 27 (questioning the causal direction of empirical findings that 
better compliance systems are correlated with a culture of compliance, which is considered 
an essential element of actual compliance). 
  85. Coglianese & Nash, The Promise & Performance of Management-Based 
Strategies, in LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR, supra note 82, at 261. 
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self-regulation components, have been criticized as costing far more than initially 
anticipated.86 
Third, information asymmetry between regulator and regulated can lead 
to “cosmetic compliance” that looks good on paper but does little to address the 
underlying behavior.87 For example, some studies have concluded that many 
common elements of enforced self-regulatory regimes—including ethics and 
conduct codes, and some types of employee training—are of limited effectiveness 
in combating the underlying conduct at issue.88 As with other research on enforced 
self-regulation, however, the findings are mixed, with some studies showing 
                                                                                                                
  86. See, e.g., id. at 253 (stating that future research will need to determine 
whether management-based regulations are cost-justified and reporting that “some 
businesses have consumed tens of thousands of management hours complying with the 
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Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under Clean Air Act, Section 
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  87. John C. Coffee, Jr., “Carrot and Stick” Sentencing: Structuring Incentives 
for Organizational Defendants, 3 FED. SENT’G REP. 126, 127 (1990) (noting the possibility 
that “a perverse incentive may arise to invest in cosmetic monitoring—that is, monitoring 
that has no real impact on employee behavior, but that looks good at sentencing if the 
corporation is ever convicted”); Krawiec, supra note 79 (warning of “cosmetic 
compliance”); Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate 
Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 106 (“[T]he objective indicators of a 
values-based program are also easy to mimic, making it difficult to separate out the sincere 
programs from the fakes.”). 
  88. Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention Is a Poor Substitute for a Pound 
of Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in 
Employment Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 31–38 (2001) 
(reviewing studies of the effectiveness of sexual harassment training and concluding that 
there is “no scientific basis . . . that harassment training fosters employee tolerance and 
greatly alters workplace culture”); Kalev et al., supra note 83, at 590, 611 (finding that 
diversity training and diversity evaluations have no impact on levels of female and minority 
representation in management and that mentoring and networking programs show only 
modest effects); Marie McKendall et al., Ethical Compliance Programs and Corporate 
Illegality: Testing the Assumptions of the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, 37 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 367, 380 (2002) (implementing a longitudinal study and finding that the presence of 
OSG-recommended compliance structures do not reduce the incidence of OSHA 
violations); M. Cash Mathews, Codes of Ethics: Organizational Behavior and Misbehavior, 
in 9 RESEARCH IN CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE AND POLICY 107, 108–09, 125 
(William C. Frederick & Lee E. Preston eds., 1987) (examining the incidence of civil and 
administrative actions taken by four federal regulatory agencies against 485 corporations 
from 1973 through 1980 and concluding that “there is little relationship between codes of 
conduct [and their enforcement mechanisms] and corporate violations”); M. Schwartz, The 
Nature of the Relationship Between Corporate Codes of Ethics and Behaviour, 32 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 247, 253 (2001) (concluding that although ethics codes may have the potential to 
alter employee behavior, “this appears to take place on very rare occasions”). 
2009] RETURN OF THE ROGUE 147 
positive effects for at least some internal compliance mechanisms.89 Such mixed 
findings have led several researchers to question whether at least some self- and 
enforced self-regulation is more effective at staving off more onerous mandatory 
performance-based rules than at reforming behavior.90 
Finally, there is an incentive for various interest groups to use enforced 
self-regulation as a profit opportunity. For convenience, those interest groups are 
hereafter referred to as “legal intermediaries,” because they frequently act as 
middlemen between the enactment of new legal rules and their interpretation and 
implementation. 
When business or financial institutions become subject to a new 
regulation, such as the operational risk requirements of Basel II, that regulation is 
subjected to an internal and external process by which the new law gains content. 
Although this is true to some extent with nearly all laws (which frequently are 
ambiguous, poorly articulated, or subject to differing interpretations) it is 
particularly true with respect to enforced self-regulatory regimes, such as Basel II, 
which are purposely left open-ended in an effort to provide latitude and encourage 
innovation in interpretation and implementation.91 
Whereas advocates of enforced self-regulation celebrate such open-ended 
guidelines as an opportunity for the negotiation of creative solutions to governance 
problems, critics predict a different outcome. Analogizing to the literature on 
incomplete contracts, some observers warn that the open-ended law characteristic 
of enforced self-regulation presents a potentially dangerous opportunity for 
strategic renegotiation by those with the greatest stake in the contested meaning of 
law—the regulated group and various interest groups within and without it.92 
                                                                                                                
  89. See, e.g., Kalev et al., supra note 83, at 611 (finding that affirmative action 
plans, diversity committees, and diversity staff all positively impact the representation of 
women and minorities in senior management positions); Parker & Nielsen, supra note 81, at 
24–26 (finding that six of twenty-one internal compliance system elements—a written 
compliance policy, a dedicated compliance function, a clearly defined system for handling 
customer/client complaints, a clearly designed system for handling compliance failures, 
compliance training for new employees, and review of the compliance system by an 
external consultant—were associated with better compliance management in practice). 
  90. Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and Substance in 
Employment Discrimination Law Practice, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 967–76 (1999) 
(arguing that many employers adopt minimally disruptive symbolic antidiscrimination 
compliance policies and procedures that result in little, if any, substantive change in the 
employment environment); Jason Scott Johnston, The Promise and Limits of Voluntary 
Management-Based Regulatory Reform: An Analysis of EPA’s Strategic Goals Program, in 
LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR, supra note 82, at 167–200 (arguing that self-interest in 
forestalling regulation was part of the motive for the creation of the metal-finishing 
Strategic Goals Program, but that this motive does not preclude the possibility that the 
program successfully reduced environmental damage at a lower cost than EPA top-down 
regulation); Krawiec, supra note 79, at 489–90 (documenting this possibility across several 
different legal regimes); PETER W. MORGAN & GLENN H. REYNOLDS, THE APPEARANCE OF 
IMPROPRIETY: HOW THE ETHICS WARS HAVE UNDERMINED AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 
BUSINESS, & SOCIETY 73–98 (1997) (tracing the birth of the compliance industry). 
  91. Krawiec, supra note 79, at 516–22. 
  92. Id. at 522–37 (detailing this negotiation process). 
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Although policymakers retain the authority to reject these gap-filling 
interpretations as inconsistent with the initial regulatory contract, policymakers 
have limited time, expertise, and incentives to differentiate ex post a self-serving 
or inefficient interpretation from one that best serves the public interest. As a 
result, self-interested private actors with a stake in the interpretation of regulatory 
policy may influence policy and implementation substantially, appropriating more 
than their fair share of the social benefits of legal policy, and undermining its 
efficacy and efficiency in the process.93 
To illustrate, researchers have noted the role played by various legal 
intermediaries, including accountants,94 lawyers,95 human resources personnel,96 
and psychiatrists,97 in interpreting and implementing ambiguous statutes or legal 
                                                                                                                
  93. Id. 
  94. Max Bazerman, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 2 (4th ed. 
1998) (arguing that audit failure is inevitable because it is psychologically impossible for 
auditors to maintain objectivity in the face of self-serving bias); Max H. Bazerman et al., 
Why Good Accountants Do Bad Audits, 80 HARV. BUS. REV. 97, 98 (2002); Stephen J. 
Mezias, An Institutional Model of Organizational Practice: Financial Reporting at the 
Fortune 200, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 431, 435 (1990) (noting that accountants may have played a 
role in the diffusion and institutionalization of certain financial reporting practices across 
Fortune 200 corporations). 
  95. Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance 
Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOC. 406, 412–14 (1999) [hereinafter, The 
Endogeneity of Legal Regulation] (detailing the roles of personnel and legal professionals in 
the diffusion and institutionalization of grievance procedures as a response to EEO law); 
Lauren B. Edelman et al., Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat of 
Wrongful Discharge, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 47, 60–62 (1992) [hereinafter Professional 
Construction of Law] (discussing overstatements of legal risk by HR personnel and legal 
practitioners, as well as remedies to such risk within each group’s respective area of 
expertise); Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role 
of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375, 375 (1997) 
(predicting that lawyers will systematically overstate legal risk when advising clients). 
  96. See, e.g., James N. Baron et al., War and Peace: The Evolution of Modern 
Personnel Administration in U.S. Industry, 92 AM. J. SOC. 350, 373–77 (1986) (tracing a 
proliferation of certain personnel practices, such as job evaluation and promotion testing, to 
attempts by personnel professionals to establish and maintain their strategic position within 
firms during the 1940s, a time when union activity was on the rise, and personnel 
professionals marketed themselves as having the ability to constrain union power); Frank 
Dobbin & Erin Kelly, How to Stop Harassment: The Professional Construction of Legal 
Compliance in Organizations, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1203, 1204 (2007) (studying the role played 
by personnel professionals in the development and acceptance of internal grievance 
procedures as a defense to organizational liability in sexual harassment cases); Edelman et 
al., Professional Construction of Law, supra note 95, at 60–62 (discussing the role of HR 
personnel as legal intermediaries); Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation, 
supra note 95, at 412–14 (same). 
  97. See Daniel J. Givelber et al., Tarasoff: Myth and Reality: An Empirical Study 
of Private Law in Action, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 443, 446–48 (arguing that psychiatric 
professional associations interpreted Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 551 
P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976), a case holding that psychotherapists owe a duty of care to third parties 
whom their patients have threatened to harm, in a manner that reflects the concerns of 
mental health care professionals and that this interpretation eventually became settled law). 
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rulings in a manner that furthers their professional self-interest. As demonstrated in 
Part II.C., below, there is already substantial jockeying by legal intermediaries—
including lawyers, accountants, and risk management experts—over the meaning 
and implementation of Basel II’s operational risk provisions. 
C. Operational Risk and Enforced Self-Regulation—A Bad Combination 
Leaving aside debates on the efficacy of enforced self-regulation in other 
contexts, I argue in this Section that operational risk is an especially poor 
candidate for enforced self-regulation. As shown in Subsection 1 of this Section, 
problems of data scarcity, modeling uncertainty, and the context-dependent nature 
of many operational risk events mean that the enforcement element of the enforced 
self-regulation model will likely face severe problems in the case of operational 
risk management. Moreover, as demonstrated in Subsection 2 of this Section, these 
same problems leave extraordinary room under Basel II for regulated banks and 
their legal intermediaries—particularly lawyers, accountants, and risk management 
experts—to define the terms of Basel II in a manner that furthers professional self-
interest, rather than the public interest. 
1. The Measurement Challenge 
Basel II was not the first foray by the international banking community 
into enforced self-regulation. In 1996, the Basel Committee made a significant 
break with prior practice by permitting regulatory minimum capital requirements 
covering market risk exposures arising from banks’ trading activities to be based 
on banks’ own internal risk measurement models.98 Both regulators and the 
banking community widely supported this move at the time, but it is considered by 
many to fundamentally differ from the later operational risk provisions of Basel II. 
First, by 1996, market risk modeling was in a fairly advanced state and 
many financial institutions had devoted considerable resources toward developing 
value-at-risk (VaR) models to measure potential losses in their trading portfolios.99 
As previously discussed, operational risk models have not yet reached this level of 
precision or sophistication.100 Moreover, market risk models are considered more 
amenable to backtesting than are operational risk models. As a result, market risk 
may be more suitable than operational risk to a regulatory approach of delegation 
                                                                                                                
  98. Beverly J. Hirtle et al., Using Credit Risk Models for Regulating Capital: 
Issues and Options, 7 ECON. POL’Y REV. 19, 19 (2001). 
  99. Id. 
100. See, e.g., Jose A. Lopez, U.S. Supervisory Standards for Operational Risk 
Management, FED. RES. BD. S.F. ECONOMIC LETTER 1 (May 4, 2007), available at 
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2007/el2007-11.html (stating that 
“operational risk is a relatively new field, so understandably financial institutions have 
made less progress in developing formal models for it”); BASEL COMM. ON BANKING 
SUPERVISION, OBSERVED RANGE OF PRACTICE IN KEY ELEMENTS OF ADVANCED 
MEASUREMENT APPROACHES (AMA) 22 (Oct. 2006) [hereinafter OBSERVED RANGE], 
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs131.htm (noting that “[w]hile the industry has 
made significant progress in modeling operational risk, limited internal data and significant 
differences in loss experiences across banks, and across business lines, make it difficult to 
determine preferred models”). 
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of authority to financial institutions followed by oversight as a substitute for “top 
down” regulation.101  
To illustrate, both risk managers and regulators rely on backtesting to 
check the validity of VaR models. VaR, which was sanctioned by the Basel 
Committee in 1996 as the standard measure of risk, measures the maximum 
possible loss of a portfolio over a given period of time at a specified confidence 
level.102 The bank’s internal risk measurement model is used to calculate VaR, 
which is then reported to the bank supervisor daily, along with realized profit and 
loss figures.103 From this information, the bank supervisor can backtest the model 
for validity. If the number of exceptions, or tail losses, that exceed VaR are too 
high, an automatic increase in the capital requirement results.104 Relative to market 
risk, however, the number of operational tail events may be quite small or 
nonexistent, rendering this backtesting process difficult. 
Whether the prior consensus on the amenability of market risk to 
enforced self-regulation will survive the current financial crisis, which many 
blame on faulty market and credit risk models, remains to be seen. As the crisis 
deepens, antagonism to VaR and other statistical methods for modeling market risk 
exposures has intensified in some quarters.105 Whereas critics argue that VaR’s 
focus on more probable, quantifiable events causes some institutions to ignore the 
more improbable events that sparked the current financial crisis and other well-
known risk management mishaps, VaR defenders contend that the fault lies not 
with mathematical models, but with human error.106 Whatever the shortcomings, if 
any, posed by current methods for modeling and assessing market risk levels, there 
appears to be little dispute that operational risk presents significant modeling and 
data collection challenges not posed by market and credit risk measurement. This 
is particularly true with regard to the low-frequency, high-impact operational 
events, such as rogue trading. 
                                                                                                                
101. Michael Power, The Invention of Operational Risk, 12 REV. INT’L POL. 
ECON. 577, 585–86 (2005). But see Andre Lucas, Evaluating the Basel Guidelines for 
Backtesting Banks’ Internal Risk Management Models, 33 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 
826, 831, 842 (2001) (demonstrating that, under current supervisory requirements, banks are 
prone to underreport their market risk and that much higher penalties are required to align 
banks’ preferences with those of the supervisor); infra notes 205–09 and accompanying text 
(discussing the manipulation and misreporting of VaR at various banks). 
102. Lucas, supra note 101, at 829. For banks, the Basel guidelines specify a time 
horizon of ten days and a confidence interval of 99%. In other words, banks’ VaR models 
must measure the maximum loss that can occur with a 99% probability during any ten-day 
period. AMENDMENT TO THE CAPITAL ACCORD, supra note 31, at 44. 
103. Lucas, supra note 101, at 829. 
104. Id. at 830 (describing this backtesting process and the resulting possible 
penalties in detail). 
105. See Nocera, supra note 5 (discussing this debate). 
106. Id.; see also Philippe Jorion, Risk Management Lessons From Long-Term 
Capital Management, 6 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 277 (2000) (noting that VaR was widely blamed 
for the failure of Long-Term Capital Management, and demonstrating the methods by which 
LTCM exploited weaknesses in its risk management system to generate what appeared to be 
arbitrage profits based on recent history that were also bets on extreme events). 
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Finally, operational risk is significantly more context-dependent than 
either market or credit risk, being driven largely by complex human factors that 
vary from scenario to scenario and that are subject to influence by bank 
management.107 Again, this is especially true of low-frequency, high-impact events 
like rogue trading that many consider the greatest operational risk challenge. 
Operational risk modeling is made even more challenging by the lack of 
sufficient data. The insufficiency of internal loss data is demonstrated by the Loss 
Data Collection Exercise and Quantitative Impact Study, conducted by U.S. 
federal bank and thrift regulatory agencies in 2004.108 Those studies found that for 
most of the twenty-three banks studied, the median number of operational risk 
events was less than 200, with only four banks reporting more than 2,500 losses 
with values over $10,000.109 Most of the reported losses were concentrated in a 
limited number of business lines, particularly fines by securities regulators.110 
Most regulated banks thus possess insufficient internal data to assess 
operational risk at high levels of statistical certainty, and the problem is 
particularly acute with regard to low-frequency, high-impact events. This concern 
was best summarized by Basel itself in its range of practices survey, which 
concluded that: 
It is generally accepted that the severity of operational risk loss data 
tends to be heavy-tailed and methodologies for modelling 
operational risk must be able to capture this attribute. This is 
particularly challenging for many banks, as most have relatively 
scant datasets and few, if any, tail events.111 
To compensate for this dearth of internal data, the Basel II Accord also 
permits the use of external operational loss data, gathered from outside sources 
such as industry consortia, third-party vendors, and media outlets.112 External risk 
data present other problems, however. First, there is a reporting bias in external 
data. Some researchers have found, for example, that losses as large as $100 
                                                                                                                
  107. Cummins et al., supra note 39, at 2610 (stating that some opponents of 
regulating operational risk take the position that it is idiosyncratic “earnings noise” that can 
be diversified away by shareholders); Holmes, supra note 39. 
  108. FED. RESERVE SYS. ET AL., RESULTS OF THE 2004 LOSS DATA COLLECTION 
EXERCISE FOR OPERATIONAL RISK, May 12, 2005, at 1, available at http://www.bos.frb.org/ 
bankinfo/qau/papers/pd051205.pdf. 
  109. Id. at 7; Patrick McConnell, Operational Risk Capital Under Basel II – Dead 
on Arrival?, RISK MGMT. (Australia), June 21, 2007, available at http:// 
www.riskmanagementmagazine.com.au/articles/39/0C04DA39.asp?Type=124&Category=1
240. 
  110. FED. RESERVE SYS. ET AL., supra note 108, at 9, 30–31. 
  111. OBSERVED RANGE, supra note 100, at 26; see also Patrick De Fontnouvelle et 
al., Capital and Risk: New Evidence on Implications of Large Operational Losses, 38 J. 
MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 1819, 1821 (2006) (stating that “[d]ata sparseness is a 
particular problem if the size distribution of operational losses is heavy-tailed (as it appears 
from our results), as it is difficult to estimate the tails of such distributions using small data 
sets”). 
  112. Lopez, supra note 100, at 2; OBSERVED RANGE, supra note 100, at 26–28. 
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million may never be publicly disclosed.113 Statistical techniques must account for 
this bias in order to produce credible estimates of operational risk.114 Moreover, 
bank management must be able to determine the extent to which external loss data 
is comparable to their own risk exposures.115 
In light of these data challenges, banks must employ two other 
operational risk assessment mechanisms under Basel II: scenario analysis and 
business environment and internal control factors (BEICFs).116 Scenario analysis is 
a method of estimating the impact of hypothetical but plausible extreme events. As 
such, it can allow banks to account for tail events for which there is no or limited 
existing data.117 However, the Basel range of practices survey found that banks’ 
use of scenario analyses varied widely, with some banks using it not at all and 
others using primarily scenario analysis, rather than internally or externally 
generated data, to account for operational risk.118 As to BEICFs, such as “business 
line rate of growth, new product introductions, findings from the challenge process 
(e.g., internal audit results), employee turnover and system downtime,” the Basel 
range of practices survey found that very few banks had “determined how to 
quantify their impact on operational risk” measures.119 
In sum, the significant quantification challenge posed by operational risk 
(particularly tail events, including rogue trading) has yet to be resolved to the 
satisfaction of many industry observers. As noted by one commentator just months 
prior to the anticipated Basel II implementation date for most member countries, 
“even at [this] late stage, there is no industry consensus on how to model 
operational risk and to calculate operational risk capital.”120 Indeed, Basel’s own 
earlier range of practices study found a “wide range” of operational risk modeling 
practices across the banking industry and warned that this “raises the possibility 
that banks with similar risk profiles could hold different levels of capital under the 
AMA if they rely on substantially different modeling approaches and 
assumptions.”121 
2.  The Profit Opportunity 
The lack of a general consensus described in the prior Subsection 1 
regarding operational risk definition, modeling, measurement, and control methods 
means that the Basel II Accord leaves room for definition and negotiation among 
regulated banks’ internal and external agents. This includes bank management, 
                                                                                                                
113. De Fountnouvelle et al., supra note 111, at 1822. 
114. Id. 
115. Lopez, supra note 100, at 2. 
116. Id. at 2–3. 
117. OBSERVED RANGE, supra note 100, at 26. 
118. Id. at 27. 
119. Id. at 14; Lopez, supra note 100, at 3. 
120. McConnell, supra note 109; see also Cummins & Embrechts, supra note 42, 
at 2602 (stating that “[s]tatistical uncertainty of the individual VaR estimates together with 
little knowledge on the interdependence between different classes imply a very high level of 
non-robustness of the final estimates”). As noted supra note 18, controversy and 
implementation problems have delayed the effective Basel II date in the United States. 
121. OBSERVED RANGE, supra note 100, at 26. 
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who have an interest in the interpretation and implementation of Basel II’s 
provisions, and legal intermediaries—particularly lawyers, accountants, and risk 
management experts, each of whom can credibly assert some expertise on the 
topic. As stated by Michael Power, “[o]perational risk as a broadly defined 
boundary object provides opportunities for internal agents, such as lawyers and 
accountants, to redefine and reposition their work in terms of risk management.”122 
Accountants, for example, may seek to define operational risk as 
primarily related to internal controls and auditing functions. The comments of one 
industry observer illustrate the internal control conception well: “I do not think that 
BIS or any other regulatory authority can come up with any rules for how much 
capital banks can hold against operational risk. The first line of defense for such 
risk is internal controls.”123 As stated by another, “operational risk management is 
about internal controls, not about quantification and capitalization.”124 
Lawyers, in contrast, may package operational risk management in terms 
of organizational governance and legal compliance issues. As stated by one author 
on a legal website, for example, “[g]iven how quickly inappropriate practices can 
lead to significant losses and reputational consequences, the legal and compliance 
function in financial institutions must be vigilant and active in assisting in the 
identification, monitoring and mitigation of operational risks.”125 
Both the auditor’s internal control conception and the lawyer’s legal 
compliance conception of operational risk management are in contrast to the view 
of operational risk embraced by most risk management specialists. Such 
specialists, trained in financial economics and possessing quantitative and 
modeling skills and training, tend to view operational risk as a poor cousin to 
market and credit risk, amenable someday—with sufficient attention and effort—
to measuring, modeling, and testing.126 As lamented by one risk management 
expert commenting on the blurring of risk management with compliance and audit 
functions, “[i]n many organisations risk management has been subsumed into the 
audit organisation and there are a growing number of ‘risk management’ 
consultancies that are offshoots of external auditing firms.”127 
None of this is meant to suggest that senior management of banking 
institutions are uninvolved in constructing the meaning of operational risk under 
Basel II, bringing their own interests to bear in the interpretation. Those interests 
include defining operational risk and its management under Basel II in a manner 
                                                                                                                
122. Power, supra note 101, at 585. 
123. Netter & Poulsen, supra note 19, at 21. 
124. Penny Cagan, Standard Operating Procedures, ERISK.COM, Mar. 2001, at 2, 
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that maximizes predictability and minimizes costs, especially the costs of any 
alterations to a profitable trading environment.128 
Understanding the significance of this interest requires some analysis of 
the conundrum faced by financial institutions with respect to operational risk 
losses, particularly the low-frequency, high-impact events related to employee 
misconduct, such as rogue trading. Although it has been argued that operational 
risk differs from market and credit risk in that the assumption of greater risk does 
not increase returns,129 the calculation is not so simple with regard to the 
possibility of rogue trading. 
A wide array of state and federal laws, regulatory rules, and self-
regulatory organization (SRO) guidelines mandate that financial institutions 
adequately supervise their employees.130 Most financial institutions have 
implemented elaborate compliance procedures and programs in an apparent 
attempt to meet these requirements. Many firms spend millions of dollars each 
year on expensive computer and reporting systems and on supervisory personnel 
designed to control abusive trading practices.131 
The continued existence of rogue trading in the face of these extensive 
legal and institutional disincentives presents a mystery for many scholars and 
industry observers. Why would management permit its employees to behave in a 
manner that jeopardizes not only the continued existence of the firm (and hence, of 
management employment) but that also risks the integrity of the markets in which 
the firm operates? Are financial institutions incapable of understanding the forces 
that give rise to rogue trading? Is rogue trading simply impossible to eliminate? 
Financial institutions are neither helpless nor naive in the face of 
employee attempts to evade the firm’s trading limits. Instead, it is more likely that 
the costs of deterring rogue trading are commonly underestimated. As a result, 
attempts at the enforced self-regulation of operational risk must be viewed with the 
recognition that banking institutions likely have determined to tolerate at least 
                                                                                                                
128. Cf. Dobbin & Kelly, supra note 96, at 1204, 1236 (discussing the turf battle 
between HR personnel and lawyers in determining the role of grievance procedures and 
employee training as a response to changing EEO law, and determining that personnel won 
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some evasion of the firms’ trading limits, because to reduce the risk of rogue 
trading to zero is prohibitively costly.132 
To begin with, in any trading environment there is a risk that, if left 
unchecked, employees will attempt to hide losses and fabricate profits. Because 
larger trading profits result in a larger bonus, traders can enhance their own wealth 
and welfare by fabricating profits. Similarly, when trades go sour, the trader has an 
incentive to hide his losses from superiors, hoping to recoup the loss later, perhaps 
by engaging in riskier trades in an attempt to make up previous losses.133 
The proprietary trader has at his disposal a large amount of the firm’s 
resources that he can use to maximize his own bonus compensation. If he 
leverages those resources and takes large risks, his reward is potentially greater. Of 
course, if his trades are unsuccessful, this leverage and risk mean that his losses 
will be greater, resulting in reduced compensation and/or job loss. However, 
reduced compensation, job loss, and loss of esteem and status inevitably result for 
insufficiently profitable traders, even if low levels of leverage and risk are pursued. 
Accordingly, there are asymmetric costs and benefits to exceeding the firm’s 
trading limits: except in the most extreme cases (such as a Jerome Kerviel or Nick 
Leeson), when international notoriety and criminal sanctions result, the downside 
of trading loss is limited to employment termination or reduced compensation, 
whereas the trader’s gain can be improved substantially through greater risk and 
leverage. 
The incentives for employees to engage in rogue trading, therefore, are 
pervasive, and management’s attempts to control such conduct are subject to three 
countervailing forces. First, at least some supervisory and management personnel 
likely make a conscious decision to tolerate or turn a blind eye to some evasions of 
the firm’s trading limits, particularly for successful traders.134 This is because 
higher risks and larger positions can, in the hands of a talented trader, translate into 
higher trading profits. As a result, others within the firm—including some with 
supervisory power—have an incentive to tolerate trading limit evasions by 
successful traders. In the cases of Jerome Kerviel, Joseph Jett, Nick Leeson, and 
many other rogue traders, for example, the evidence raises at least a colorable 
claim that others within the firm were, or should have been, aware of the trading 
violations, while at other banks (such as NAB) there is direct evidence of such 
knowledge by superiors.135 As stated in the Price Waterhouse Report prepared for 
the Singapore Minister of Finance: 
                                                                                                                
132. A similar analysis has been applied in considering the socially optimal level 
of pollution, torts, and some crimes. George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 
78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 527 (1970). 
133. Krawiec, supra note 131, at 308–09. 
134. Id. at 316–20; Zur Shapira, Organizations’ Control of Their Market Actors: 
Managing the Risk of Government Bond Traders (New York University, Working Paper 
2006), available at www.bus.umich.edu/Academics/Departments/CSIB/CSIB/ 
Shapira_Traders_406_04-07-06.pdf. 
135. In re Kidder Peabody Sec. Litig., 10 F. Supp. 2d 398, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); 
M.L.C. San & N.T.N. Kuang, Baring Futures (Singapore) Pte Ltd., The Report of the 
Inspectors Appointed by the Minister for Finance, Singapore. Investigation Pursuant to 
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[T]he suggestion by the Baring Group’s management that they were 
unaware of the existence of account 88888 and the fact that S$1.7 
billion remitted to BFS was for trades booked in this account, gives 
rise to the inference that certain key personnel of the Baring Group 
were willfully blind to the truth.136 
Second, because the events that lead to rogue trading often involve serial 
decision-making and substantial sunk costs, supervisors and others within the firm 
may be prone to an irrational escalation of commitment.137 Third, many financial 
institutions purposely foster a firm culture that is likely to breed some employee 
rogue trading, because the same factors that facilitate rogue trading also promote 
profitable trading strategies. Although financial institutions could implement 
compliance and oversight systems so flawless that every trade was closely 
monitored and any unauthorized trading would be quickly detected, such a system 
would be extraordinarily expensive. 
The expense stems not only from the costs of software, reporting systems, 
and supervisory personnel, but also from the fact that fully rendering the trading 
floor accountable to management would entail an alteration of the carefully crafted 
institutional norms that encourage traders to maximize the firm’s profits.138 To 
illustrate, many firms have purposely fashioned an incentive structure and firm 
culture that fosters three general norms conducive to rogue trading: (1) 
materialism; (2) risk-taking; and (3) independence. Financial institutions promote 
these traits, not for the purpose of encouraging rogue trading, but because these 
same norms give rise to successful and profitable traders.139 
                                                                                                                
Section 231 of the Companies Act (Chapter 50), ¶ 8.25 (1995) [hereinafter Price 
Waterhouse Report] (copy on file with author); see also discussion infra Part III.B–C. 
(discussing the Kerviel, Jett, Leeson, Rusnak, NAB, and other rogue trading cases in detail). 
136. Price Waterhouse Report, supra note 135, ¶ 8.25. 
137. Escalation theory stems from research indicating that people and groups are 
more prone to a particular type of bias—a tendency to escalate commitment—when faced 
with a series of decisions, rather than with an isolated decision. Studies have shown that the 
likely response to such situations is an escalation of commitment to the previously selected 
course of action beyond that predicted by rational decision-making models. MAX 
BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 66 (4th ed. 1998). The tendency 
to escalate is especially pronounced when an explanation for failure that is unpredictable 
and outside the control of the decision-maker can be identified, such as a market downturn 
or economic shock. Barry M. Staw & Jerry Ross, Commitment to a Policy Decision: A 
Multi-Theoretical Perspective, 23 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 40, 44–46 (1978). 
138. Gordon L. Clark, Rogues and Regulation in Global Finance: Maxwell, 
Leeson, and the City of London, 31.3 REGIONAL STUD. 221, 226 (1997); Srilata Zaheer, 
Acceptable Risk: A Study of Global Currency Trading Rooms in the U.S. and Japan, in THE 
PERFORMANCE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: EFFICIENCY, INNOVATION, REGULATION 462, 462 
(Patrick T. Harker & Stavros A. Zenios eds., 2000). 
139. Krawiec, supra note 131, at 329–32. Cf. Albert S. Kyle & F. Albert Wang, 
Speculation Duopoly with Agreement to Disagree: Can Overconfidence Survive the Market 
Test?, 52 J. FIN. 2073, 2074 (1997) (arguing that “a fund can also promote its long-run 
survival by instituting an incentive scheme to shift its rational manager’s probability 
distribution toward more aggressive trading as if he were overconfident”). 
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This is not to suggest that traders arrive on the trading floor a 
psychological and cultural blank slate. Indeed, prospective traders likely do not 
represent a random cross-section of the population, but instead enter the firm with 
a predefined set of preferences, which are then sharpened and intensified through 
the firm’s incentive structure and socialization networks.140 
Once hired, the institutional environment operates to reinforce those 
characteristics in traders.141 For example, traders have a heightened sense of 
materialism because the firm’s incentive structure is specifically designed to foster 
such an attitude. Unlike jobs in most other fields, there is no real career ladder on 
the trading floor. Instead, the trading hierarchy tends to consist primarily of traders 
who earn higher trading profits versus those who earn less. Rather than rewarding 
superior performance with titles and promotions, successful traders tend to be 
rewarded primarily with larger bonuses and, perhaps, less oversight.142 
The compensation structure on the trading floor at most financial 
institutions (typically based on trading profits earned in the current fiscal year) also 
encourages risk-taking, by sending a message that short-term profits will be 
rewarded, even if incurred at the expense of greater risk. This message may be far 
stronger and more persuasive than the countervailing message embodied in the 
firm’s written codes of conduct.143 
Not only organizational management, but also regulatory bodies such as 
the SEC, are well aware of the moral hazard problem posed by the compensation 
structures at most financial institutions.144 Various attempts over the years by some 
                                                                                                                
140. Individuals with a particular psychological and personality makeup are 
attracted to, and survive in, trading institutions. Those individuals tend to be relatively 
comfortable with taking large risks and must have the ability to think and act quickly and to 
prosper under stressful conditions. MITCHEL Y. ABOLAFIA, MAKING MARKETS: 
OPPORTUNISM AND RESTRAINT ON WALL STREET 9–31 (1996). In addition, the successful 
trader is attracted to trading by a desire for income and continues to be motivated by that 
desire throughout his trading career. Finally, those attracted to a career in trading are 
typically independent and entrepreneurial. They often reject the hierarchy and lack of 
autonomy that characterizes other corporate jobs. Id. 
141. The socialization of new traders begins with the training program, which 
typically includes a short period of classroom training and then a longer period as an intern 
on the trading floor. During this period, the institutional norms of materialism, risk-taking, 
and independence are solidified and reinforced. Krawiec, supra note 131, at 328–29. 
142. ABOLAFIA, supra note 140, at 18–30. 
143. Deborah A. DeMott, Organizational Incentives to Care About the Law, 60 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39, 45 (Autumn 1997) (“As an organization, the corporation 
defines rewards and penalties; by doing so it creates incentives for agents to act in ways that 
promise rewards conferred by the organization. These incentives can be so strong that they 
mute the message otherwise conveyed by the organization’s instructions to its agents.”); 
Krawiec, supra note 131, at 329–32; Schwarcz, supra note 13 (discussing the misaligned 
incentives of secondary managers caused by financial firms’ current compensation 
structure). 
144. See Bonus Points, ECONOMIST, Apr. 15, 1995, at 71 (noting that the Barings 
Bank rogue trading scandal caused many firms to conclude that their compensation 
structures provided similar perverse incentives); Press Release, SEC, SEC Chairman Levitt 
Receives Compensation Committee’s Report Highlighting Industry ‘Best Practices’; Calls 
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financial institutions to revise employee compensation packages suggest that firms 
are aware of the costs associated with existing compensation schemes, but struggle 
to balance a compensation system that successfully discourages employee 
misconduct against the need to create incentives and preferences that maximize 
profitability.145 
Lastly, traders are expected to be self-reliant and entrepreneurial, traits 
not always conducive to mutual monitoring. As a result, traders may operate in an 
independent environment in which they perceive their primary obligation as 
maximizing the value of their own account and feel little duty to oversee those 
around them for potential violations of the firm’s trading rules.146 
In sum, financial institutions do not suffer operational losses, such as 
those stemming from rogue trading, because they are unaware that such risk exists 
or do not understand how to control employee misconduct. Instead, firms likely 
make an affirmative calculation to tolerate some level of employee misconduct, 
because to reduce such risk to zero is not financially worthwhile. As elaborated in 
                                                                                                                
on Entire Industry to Review Closely, S.E.C. 95-64 (Apr. 10, 1995), at 1, available at 1995 
WL 154267  (studying the incentives for broker churning and the recommendation of 
unsuitable investments provided by the compensation structure of most securities broker-
dealers); PROMONTORY FIN. GROUP & WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ, REPORT TO THE 
BOARDS OF DIRECTORS OF ALLIED IRISH BANKS, P.L.C., ALLFIRST FINANCIAL INC., AND 
ALLFIRST BANK CONCERNING CURRENCY TRADING LOSSES 31 (Mar. 12, 2002) [hereinafter 
LUDWIG REPORT], available at http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/special/ 
2002/aib/ludwig.pdf (criticizing AIB’s compensation structure—which was similar to that 
at most firms—for contributing to Rusnak’s rogue trading). 
145. Morgan Stanley, which in 2008 revised its compensation policy to provide 
traders with 65% of bonus pay in deferred compensation vesting over three years, is the 
most recent and prominent example.  Joe Nocera, First, Let’s Fix the Bonuses, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 20, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/21/business/ 
21nocera.html?scp=9&sq=joe%20nocera%20compensation&st=cse (arguing that Wall 
Street’s system of trader compensation creates perverse incentives that encourage short-
term risk-taking at the expense of long-term institutional stability). However, the 
unsuccessful struggles of Salomon Brothers to revise its compensation system illustrate the 
challenges encountered by some firms seeking similar compensation system reforms. After 
the firm’s 1994 trading scandal, Salomon overhauled its compensation system to provide 
investment bankers, traders, and other employees with as much as half their pay in Salomon 
Brothers stock at a 15% discount, which could not be sold for five years. Bonus Points, 
supra note 144, at 71 (discussing efforts by various financial services firms to restructure 
their compensation systems in an effort to reduce agency costs and unauthorized activities); 
Pay Dirt: Salomon Brothers, ECONOMIST, July 1, 1995, at 67 (reporting that, after 
announcing the plan, which was quickly discontinued, Salomon lost dozens of employees, 
especially traders); Michael Siconolfi, Salomon Looks at Backing Out of Pay Plan, WALL 
ST. J., Apr. 25, 1995, at C1. 
146. Abolafia, supra note 140, at 28 (quoting one trader as saying, “It’s a very 
entrepreneurial business. No one is going to help you make money. They’re too busy 
helping themselves.”). Cf. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE: SUMMARY OF 
PWC DIAGNOSTIC REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE ACTION PLAN 7 (May 23, 2008), available 
at http://www.socgen.com/sg/file/fichierig/documentIG_5197/pricewatercooper.pdf 
(discussing the “strong entrepreneurial culture” at Société Générale that led to rampant 
trading violations and the Jerome Kerviel rogue trading scandal). 
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the following Part III through the examples of recent rogue trading incidents, it is 
implausible to assume that capital set aside rules such as those embodied in Basel 
II would have impacted the operational risk assessment at any of the financial 
institutions discussed in that Part, because each was unable or, more likely, 
unwilling to acknowledge the numerous warning signs of increasing operational 
risk levels within the institution, instead turning a blind eye to common red flags. 
III. AN ANALYSIS OF ROGUE TRADING CASES 
This Part analyzes several well-known rogue trading cases, with a 
particular focus on the recent Jerome Kerviel rogue trading scandal at Société 
Générale. Similarities will be drawn between the Kerviel case and other rogue 
trading events to highlight a central tenet of this Article: enforced self-regulation 
such as that embodied in Basel II is unlikely to induce financial institutions to 
account for the possibility of rogue employees any differently than they currently 
do. This is in part because organizations, such as Société Générale, that find 
themselves confronted with massive rogue trading losses often have willfully, or at 
least recklessly, disregarded the warning signs of rising operational risk levels in 
pursuit of higher trading profits. To that end, I draw parallels between Kerviel and 
other relevant rogue trading cases, including Nick Leeson at Barings Bank,147 John 
Rusnak at Allied Irish Banks (AIB),148 Joseph Jett at Kidder Peabody & Co. 
(Kidder),149 and a small cohort of rogue traders at National Australia Bank 
                                                                                                                
147. Nick Leeson was a twenty-eight-year-old trader in the Singapore office of 
Barings PLC, the oldest merchant bank in Britain and financial advisor to Queen Elizabeth 
II. Although Leeson was authorized to pursue a low risk strategy of arbitraging differences 
in futures prices between the Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX) and 
either the Osaka or Tokyo exchanges, he quickly abandoned this strategy in favor of risky 
directional trades. Leeson’s role as head of both settlements and trading enabled him to 
disguise his unauthorized trading. The fraud reportedly began after a new clerk lost GBP 
20,000, which Leeson tried to cover up through an error account (the now infamous 88888 
account). Leeson then continued to use the account to hide other trading losses. As Leeson’s 
losses mounted, he increased the riskiness and size of his trades, in an effort to recoup his 
losses. In order to collect the option premiums and cover margin calls, Leeson placed a 
large number of short straddles (the simultaneous sale of a call and a put with the same 
strike price and maturity) on the Nikkei 225. When the Kobe earthquake hit, causing a sharp 
decline in the Nikkei, Barings could no longer sustain the losses, and Leeson fled the 
country. Within a few days, Barings declared bankruptcy and was eventually sold to ING 
for GBP 1. See generally Price Waterhouse Report, supra note 135. 
148. In February 2002, Ireland’s second largest bank, Allied Irish Banks, 
disclosed losses of $691 million by John Rusnak, a foreign exchange trader in its Baltimore, 
Maryland office. The bank took a one-time charge against earnings that eliminated over 
60% of 2001 earnings and severely depleted its capital. See generally LUDWIG REPORT, 
supra note 144, at 29. 
149. Despite a stellar academic record, Jett’s start in trading was a rocky one. 
After being fired first from Morgan Stanley and then from First Boston, Jett eventually 
landed on Kidder’s Zero Coupon Trading Desk in July 1991. Jett’s first performance review 
was highly negative and he received a bonus of only $5000. Shortly thereafter, Jett began to 
exploit an accounting anomaly in Kidder’s system that allowed him to record total profits in 
excess of $264 million, earning promotions, millions of dollars in bonuses, and the title of 
Kidder’s 1993 “Man of the Year.” In reality, Jett’s profits were part of a fictitious pyramid 
scheme that hid real losses of $74.7 million. Jett was banned from the securities industry in 
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(NAB).150 Where relevant, I also discuss particular aspects of other rogue trading 
incidents in somewhat less detail. 
A. On Warning Signs and Improbable Profits 
Prior to an analysis of the Kerviel and other rogue trading cases, a few 
clarifying points are in order. First, as noted throughout this Article, rogue trading 
losses at levels sufficient to generate public disclosure and subsequent outside, 
independent investigation are rare. Therefore, the rogue trading cases discussed in 
this Section, although seemingly few in number, constitute the bulk of recent rogue 
trading incidents about which meaningful amounts of independent information is 
publicly available. 
Second, by drawing parallels among these rogue trading events and 
highlighting the common warning signs among them, I do not mean to suggest that 
each of the factors discussed in this Section, in and of itself, is a red flag 
warranting a full scale investigation. For example, cancelled transactions are 
inevitable, and some traders who resist vacation time may simply be extremely 
motivated. However, the presence of a number of these factors in tandem—and 
with the frequency observed in these cases—warrants at least some level of 
institutional investigation. 
When the trader(s) in question can provide a rational explanation for the 
aberrant activity, the inquiry may end there. It is telling, however, that in each of 
the rogue trading cases discussed here, the traders were rarely questioned in any 
depth about unusual trading activity and the back-office confirmation of those 
activities was half-hearted or, in some cases, nonexistent.151 Skeptics within the 
firm were deterred with vague assurances that all was well or that the questioner 
lacked the skills to sufficiently understand the trading strategy and/or the 
explanations given.152 In some cases, back and middle office personnel were 
                                                                                                                
2004 and ordered to disgorge more than $8 million in profits. In re Orlando Joseph Jett, 
Exchange Act Release No. 8395, 2004 WL 2809317 (Mar. 5, 2004). 
150. From 2001 to 2004, a group of four currency options traders at NAB 
engaged in unauthorized trading, regularly breaching position and risk limits, and 
concealing their activity through the smoothing of profits and losses, stating incorrect rates 
for trades, and recording fictitious transactions. In January 2004, NAB announced that the 
traders had lost AUD 360 million. See generally PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 
INVESTIGATION INTO FOREIGN EXCHANGE LOSSES AT THE NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK 1 
(2004) [hereinafter NAB REPORT], available at http://www.nabgroup.com/vgnmedia/ 
downld/pwcreport.pdf. 
151. See discussion infra Part III.B–C. (detailing these facts). 
152. Along these lines, Rick Bookstaber, author of A DEMON OF OUR OWN 
DESIGN (2007), relates a hypothetical discussion between a risk manager and a trader, 
designed to illustrate the fact that the risk manager is always at a disadvantage to the trader 
when questioning trades and risk exposures. This is because: (1) the trader will always 
understand the markets in which he operates better than the risk manager; (2) by definition, 
the probabilities are such that the risk manager is likely to be wrong more often than he is 
right (in other words, his concerns, while legitimate, will most often not result in actual 
disaster); and (3) it is easy for the risk management department to occupy itself with 
paperwork, reports, meetings, and other activities that do not go to the heart of risk 
management. Conversations with the Trading Desk, http://rick.bookstaber.com/2007/12/ 
2009] RETURN OF THE ROGUE 161 
essentially bullied into submission.153 In all cases, relatively senior management 
ignored or failed to adequately investigate inquiries or alerts from their own 
employees, regulators, exchanges, and other market participants, treating such 
inquiries more as public relations problems than as a potential signal of rising 
operational risk levels.154 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in each of these cases the 
probability that the authorized trading strategy could have produced the reported 
profits is low and, in some cases, nearly impossible. For example, from mid-1991 
through the first quarter of 1994, Joseph Jett at Kidder reported over $264 million 
in profits from STRIPS (Separate Trading of Registered Interest and Principal of 
Securities) trading,155 supposedly earned through arbitraging small differences 
between the trading prices of U.S. government bonds and their component 
STRIPS.156 The problem with this explanation is that, because the market for 
Treasury securities is one of the world’s most liquid and actively traded, the 
potential for arbitrage profits is limited.157 This is illustrated by the fact that, prior 
to Jett’s employment, the record profit for STRIPS trading in a single year was 
fifteen million dollars.158 Jett’s reported profits from STRIPS trading exceeded that 
amount in a single month four different times.159 On a single transaction alone in 
1992 Jett recorded an apparent profit of $12.9 million and on another, in 1993, a 
profit of $24.2 million.160 Based on Kidder’s prior STRIPS profitability, such large 
profits on STRIPS trading would have been unusual for any trader, much less one 
with Jett’s limited experience in government bond trading and prior disappointing 
track record.161 
In reality, Jett’s reported profits were produced through a fictitious 
pyramid scheme enabled by an anomaly in Kidder’s recording and accounting 
systems (known as G1) that hid Jett’s real trading losses of $74.7 million. These 
fictitious profits were generated through forward reconstitutions (“forward 
recons”) with the Federal Reserve, a non-cash trade of economically equivalent 
                                                                                                                
conversations-with-trading-desk.html (Dec. 2, 2007); see also discussion infra Part III.B–C. 
(detailing this problem in connection with several specific rogue trading incidents). 
153. See infra notes 199–201 and accompanying text (discussing the Rusnak 
case). 
154. See infra notes 220–32 and accompanying text. 
155. U.S. Treasury bonds are commonly traded on the secondary market as 
separate zero coupon components of principal and interest (STRIPS). In re Kidder Peabody 
Sec. Litig., 10 F. Supp. 2d 398, 402–03 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (discussing STRIPS trading); see 
supra note 149 and accompanying text (discussing the Jett case). 
156.  In re Kidder Peabody, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 403–05; In re Orlando Joseph Jett, 
Exchange Act Release No. 8395, 2004 WL 2809317, at *16 (Mar. 5, 2004). At various 
times, Jett also attributed portions of his profits to increased market making activities and 
speculation on the movement of interest rates. Id. 
157. In re Orlando Joseph Jett, 2004 WL 2809317, at *3. 
158. In re Kidder Peabody, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 404. 
159. Id. at 404–05. 
160. Id. at 405. 
161. See supra note 149 and accompanying text (discussing Jett’s experience and 
track record); infra notes 228–31 and accompanying text (discussing other warning signs at 
Kidder). 
162 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 51:127 
securities, having no real monetary significance.162 G1, however, treated each 
forward recon as if it were a real transaction, recording the difference between the 
current price of the STRIPS and the forward price of the recon as an immediate 
profit.163 The larger the principal amount of the bond to be reconstituted or the 
further forward the settlement date, the larger the apparent profit.164 As the 
settlement date approached, however, and the trading price of the STRIPS 
converged with the forward price, G1 would generate a loss entry each day until, at 
settlement, all apparent profits were eliminated.165 In order to maintain the illusion 
of profitability, therefore, Jett had to enter more forward recons, with larger 
principal amounts, and more distant settlement dates, a task enabled by an 
“upgrade” to G1 in November 1992 that changed the forward settlement limit on 
recons from five days to any date the trader entered.166 
Although perhaps less clear-cut, similar skepticism has been expressed 
regarding both Rusnak at AIB and Leeson at Barings. For example, Rusnak’s 
trading strategy essentially became that of a one-man hedge fund. Yet, as noted in 
the Ludwig Report, a single trader in Baltimore with little support or relative 
expertise has no comparative advantage in the highly competitive and 
sophisticated hedge fund market, where the bulk of successful market participants 
have specialized knowledge and expertise, as well as greater scale and 
diversification.167 Similarly, as noted in the Price Waterhouse Report prepared for 
the Singapore Minister of Finance regarding the Leeson debacle: 
Mr. Leeson’s product managers accepted the reports of his 
considerable profitability with admiration rather than skepticism. 
They perceived no irregularity in Mr. Leeson’s trading activities 
despite the inherent limit to the profit potential of Mr. Leeson’s 
arbitrage activities. This was because the price differences that were 
arbitraged were small, and large volumes had to be transacted in 
                                                                                                                
162. In re Kidder Peabody, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 403; In re Orlando Joseph Jett, 
2004 WL 2809317, at *4–5. In order to facilitate secondary market trading in U.S. 
Treasuries the Federal Reserve will, at the request of any primary dealer, convert either a 
complete Treasury bond into its component parts (a “strip”) or the constituent parts into a 
complete bond (a “recon”). These are economically meaningless transactions—the 
equivalent of receiving from the bank two ten-dollar bills in exchange for a twenty, or vice 
versa. A forward recon is a recon entered for settlement more than one business day in the 
future. In re Kidder Peabody, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 404; In re Orlando Joseph Jett, 2004 WL 
2809317, at *4–5. 
163. The price difference arises from the fact that zero coupon bonds trade at a 
discount to their face value to reflect the return earned from compound interest at maturity, 
since no periodic interest payments are made on the bond. In re Kidder Peabody, 10 F. 
Supp. 2d at 404; In re Orlando Joseph Jett, 2004 WL 2809317, at *4–6. 
164. In re Orlando Joseph Jett, 2004 WL 2809317, at *4–6. 
165. Id. 
166. In re Kidder Peabody, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 4–5. Jett—and a group of plaintiff 
shareholders in GE (Kidder’s parent corporation)—cite this change to G1 (and other events) 
as evidence of complicity by Jett’s supervisors and Kidder management in Jett’s scheme, 
undertaken for the purpose of increasing Kidder’s apparent profitability to secure financing 
from Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS). Kidder disputes that contention. Id. at 415–17. 
167. LUDWIG REPORT, supra note 144, at 31. 
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order to realize meaningful gains. However, as the volume of such 
transactions increased, this tended to reduce the price differences, 
and therefore the potential profit from arbitrage.168 
In short, the warning signs elaborated in this part stem not from any 
single factor or specific mix of factors, but instead from the combination of 
improbable profits relative to the authorized trading strategy (particularly when 
considered in light of the trader’s prior experience and track record), and a series 
of other potential red flags. Those potential red flags include the refusal to take 
vacations, abnormally high volumes of canceled trades, trades that make no 
economic sense, extraordinarily large positions or turnover relative to total market 
activity, mismatches between cash flows and reported profits and losses, and, 
finally, the absence of a credible explanation for this aberrant activity. 
B. Trades and Concealment 
Like many rogue traders before him, Jerome Kerviel was rather 
unexceptional both personally and professionally prior to gaining rogue trading 
infamy. From a working-class background, his education and credentials were 
unimpressive, and his prior trading record unspectacular.169 
First hired from the back office onto the warrants trading desk in 2005, 
Kerviel’s unauthorized trades began almost immediately.170 In this regard, 
Kerviel’s story mirrors that of many other rogue traders, who quickly abandoned 
their authorized arbitrage and/or client trading strategy in favor of unauthorized 
directional trades.171 
                                                                                                                
168. Price Waterhouse Report, supra note 135, at Biv; see also infra notes 223–26 
and accompanying text (discussing the huge size of Leeson’s positions relative to total 
market activity). 
169. See John O’Doherty, Custom and Practice, or a Man with a Lot to Prove?, 
FIN. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2008). Like Nick Leeson before him, Kerviel had worked his way onto 
the trading desk from a back-office position. Id.; A Fallen Star, ECONOMIST, Mar. 4, 1995, 
at 19 (discussing Leeson’s working class background and his rise within Barings); see also 
In re Kidder Peabody, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 403–04 (discussing Joseph Jett’s unimpressive start 
in trading); Alan McNee, Allied Irish Banks: A Case Study, ERISK 1–2 (Apr. 2002) 
(describing Rusnak as “an unexceptional individual living quietly with his family in the 
suburbs of Baltimore,” and “not a ‘star trader’”). 
170. SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE: GEN. INSPECTION DEP’T, MISSION GREEN: SUMMARY 
REPORT 2 (2008) (translation from French) [hereinafter SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE]. Kerviel’s 
authorized trading on the warrants desk consisted of two types: client trading and 
proprietary trading. Id at 10. Client trading involved selling warrants (typically with knock-
out call options) to clients and hedging the position by purchasing the underlying assets. Id. 
Kerviel’s authorized proprietary trading—arbitrage on competitors’ turbo warrants—
primarily involved the purchase of competitors’ call turbos and a corresponding hedge 
through the sale of futures contracts. Id. 
171. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse Report, supra note 135, at Bi–ii (explaining that, 
although Leeson was authorized to engage in client trading and, later, arbitrage, he instead 
placed directional bets); LUDWIG REPORT, supra note 144, at 9–10 (reporting that, although 
John Rusnak was authorized to engage only in foreign currency arbitrage, the majority of 
his trades were directional trades using simple currency forwards); In re Kidder Peabody, 
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As is common in rogue trading cases, there is no evidence of direct 
knowledge by superiors at Société Générale of Kerviel’s overnight directional 
trades (referred to in the General Inspection Department’s report as “fraudulent 
trades”), which Kerviel hid through a variety of relatively straightforward cover-up 
schemes. However, supervisors and bank management ignored numerous warning 
signs regarding the size and scope of these trades, leading to a reasonable inference 
that at least some supervisory personnel likely turned a blind eye to Kerviel’s 
trading irregularities.172 Moreover, emails confirm that Kerviel’s immediate 
superior was aware of, and acquiesced in, some early intra-day unauthorized 
positions on equities and equity index futures (referred to in the General Inspection 
Department’s report as “unauthorized activities”).173 
Bank records show the presence of some fraudulent trades from June 
2005 through February 2006, in amounts up to EUR 15 million, primarily on 
equities.174 Those amounts grew to as large as EUR 135 million through the end of 
2006.175 
Beginning in late January 2007, Kerviel began to amass a large short 
position in DAX equity index futures, reaching EUR 28 billion on June 30, 
2007.176 Kerviel unwound this position in August of 2007 and then began building 
up a new short position, which reached EUR 30 billion on October 31, 2007.177 
Kerviel subsequently unwound that position in November 2007.178 Also during 
2007, Kerviel’s directional equities positions reached amounts as high as EUR 370 
million.179 Kerviel realized total trading profits of EUR 1.5 billion in 2007.180 
Between January 2 and January 18, 2008, Kerviel amassed a EUR 49 
billion long position on DAX futures, which the bank reportedly discovered on 
January 20. These positions were unwound between January 21–23, 2008, 
recognizing a loss of EUR 6.4 billion.181 
Although much has been made of Kerviel’s “sophisticated” cover-up 
scheme enabled by his intimate knowledge of the back-office system,182 in reality 
the bulk of Kerviel’s cover up consisted of the standard fare employed by most 
                                                                                                                
10 F. Supp. 2d at 403 (“Kidder expected Jett to make profits in part by dealing in STRIPS 
with customers and through opportunities for arbitrage.”). 
172. There is also some evidence of complicity by a trading assistant in Kerviel’s 
fraudulent scheme. SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE, supra note 170, at 3–4. 
173. Id. at 4. 
174. Id. at 2. The primary equities involved were Allianz, Solarworld, and Q-
Cells. Id. at 2 n.3. 
175. Id. at 2. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. Subtracting Kerviel’s 2007 gain of EUR 1.5 billion leads to the loss of 
EUR 4.9 billion (over $7 billion) quoted in the press. Id. 
182. See, e.g., Carol Matlack, SocGen Had Been Warned About Kerviel, BUS. 
WK., Jan. 28, 2008, available at http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/jan2008/ 
gb20080128_400149.htm. 
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rogue traders: fake trades or other system entries designed to hide unauthorized 
trading activity, backed up by lies (which were never questioned by his supervisors 
or managers) and forged documents. Kerviel hid his unauthorized trading activity 
through three concealment mechanisms: (1) the entry and cancellation of fictitious 
transactions; (2) the entry of pairs of fictitious reverse transactions; and (3) the 
booking of intra-monthly “provisions” that offset earnings or losses.183 
First, and most simply, Kerviel entered fictitious transactions into the 
system in amounts sufficient to cover his unauthorized positions that were then 
employed in the bank’s risk and valuation calculations.184 Bank records show that 
Kerviel entered 947 transactions of this type.185 
Second, Kerviel entered matched trades of equal quantities at different 
prices to generate fictitious gains and losses. For example, on March 1, 2007, 
Kerviel entered a purchase for 2,266,500 Solarworld shares at EUR 63 and the sale 
of the same number of shares at EUR 53, creating a fictitious loss of EUR 22.7 
million. Bank records reveal 115 transactions of this variety.186  
In order to avoid discovery through back-office attempts to confirm his 
trades, Kerviel cancelled these fictitious trades prior to confirmation, settlement, or 
control. To gain time, he entered transactions with some lag between the trade date 
and the confirmation, control, or settlement date.187 On the rare occasions when a 
supervisor or middle or back-office personnel questioned Kerviel regarding these 
transactions, he lied and forged emails or other confirming documents as 
support.188 
The first technique employed by Kerviel—the entry of fictitious 
transactions—resembles one used by the NAB traders, who entered fictitious 
foreign exchange spot and option transactions into the NAB system (known as 
“Horizon”).189 These fictitious transactions were concealed by taking advantage of 
a one-hour window between the close of the trading day and the beginning of the 
period when the back office began checks to verify the day’s transactions. The 
profits and losses generated by Horizon were posted to the general ledger and used 
for the creation of management reports and NAB’s financial statements. However, 
during this one-hour window before the transaction validation process began, the 
traders had time to reverse or remove the fictitious trades from Horizon, so that 
                                                                                                                
183. SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE, supra note 170, at 1. 
184. Id. at 24. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
187. For example, Kerviel used pending party names, internal client names, or 
trades with a deferred start date, all of which have delayed confirmation dates. Although 
each of these mechanisms is common industry practice, id. at 24–25, the level (and constant 
cancellation) of such activity is unusual. 
188. Id. at 8. 
189. See NAB REPORT, supra note 150, at 13. The traders also entered false 
dealing rates on genuine spot foreign exchange transactions in order to create false profits 
(and, sometimes, losses). The effect of these entries was to smooth profits and losses by 
shifting them from one period to another. Id. at 13–14. This fraud was concealed using the 
same one-hour window employed in connection with the fictitious trades. Id. 
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they were never verified by NAB’s back office.190 According to recovered emails 
and taped phone conversations, this fraud was undertaken to ensure that the 
currency options desk met year-end profit targets and that, as a result, the currency 
traders received year-end bonuses.191 PricewaterhouseCoopers identified 467 
fictitious spot transactions and seventy-eight fictitious options transactions in 
2003.192 
The second technique employed by Kerviel—reverse fictitious 
transactions—is remarkably similar to one employed by AIB’s John Rusnak, who 
used fictitious option trades to cover his trading losses and create the appearance 
that his positions were hedged.193 Rusnak’s practice was to simultaneously enter 
fictitious offsetting options trades on the same currency, with the same 
counterparty, premium, and strike price, but with different expiration dates. For 
example, Rusnak might enter the sale of a deep-in-the-money option on Japanese 
yen to a client in Asia, with an expiration date the same as the sale date.194 Such an 
option would involve the receipt of a large premium by AIB, but would also 
constitute a large liability on the bank’s balance sheet. At the same time, Rusnak 
would claim to have purchased an offsetting option from the same counterparty, 
with an expiration date several weeks or a month later. At the end of the day, 
AIB’s books reflected only that it held a valuable asset (a deep-in-the-money 
option for which the bank had supposedly paid a large premium) that concealed 
Rusnak’s losses on unauthorized directional spot and forward trades.195 
Eventually, like many prior rogue traders, Rusnak ran into funding 
problems, which he resolved by selling deep-in-the-money options that command 
a high premium. Unfortunately for AIB, such options also represent a significant 
liability on the bank’s books, which Rusnak covered through more fake options 
transactions that gave the appearance that these real deep-in-the-money options 
had been repurchased from the original counterpary.196 Nick Leeson of Barings 
used a similar strategy to fund his increasing margin calls on the SIMEX, selling 
options on Nikkei 225 futures in order to collect the premiums.197 
In considering the extent to which Rusnak’s cover-up was enabled by a 
failure of controls at AIB it is important to note two things. First, these fictitious 
paired trades made no economic sense. Counterparties would not allow deep-in-
the-money options to expire unexercised, and certainly not on a regular basis.198 
                                                                                                                
190. Id. at 13. 
191. Id. at 17. 
192. Id. at 15–16. Barings’ Nick Leeson also extensively used fictitious trades to 
hide his unauthorized activity. Price Waterhouse Report, supra note 135, at 24–26. 
193. LUDWIG REPORT, supra note 144, at 10–11. 
194. Id. An “in-the-money” call option has a strike price below the current market 
price of the underlying, such that the option could be exercised immediately at a profit. 
195. Id. at 11. 
196. Id. at 13. 
197. Price Waterhouse Report, supra note 135, at 21. 
198. See LUDWIG REPORT, supra note 144, at 10. Although normally options with 
different expiration dates would command different premia due to the time value of the 
option, a very deep-in-the-money option may have no time value, because its intrinsic value 
is so high, eroding the effect of leverage. 
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Any number of Rusnak’s superiors could have recognized this anomaly, had 
anyone chosen to pay attention. Second, in order for the scheme to succeed, AIB’s 
back office had to sign off on these transactions. Initially, Rusnak managed this by 
creating fake confirmations of his trades. Later, however, he convinced back-office 
staff that such trades required no confirmation because the cash flows offset each 
other, and because of the inconvenience caused by the time difference with 
Asia.199 Rusnak facilitated this by bullying and intimidating back-office and risk 
management staff, frequently berating them and threatening to have them fired.200 
For example, when back-office personnel complained that they were having 
trouble confirming Rusnak’s trades, Rusnak and his front-office supervisors 
blamed the back-office staff for not understanding how the transactions worked.201 
The third technique Kerviel employed, a mechanism known as a 
“provision flow,” is designed to correct modeling bias and supposedly is reserved 
only for trading assistants.202 This technique allowed Kerviel to enter positive or 
negative amounts modifying the values calculated by the front-office valuation 
system.203 The bank’s records show that Kerviel entered such provision flows nine 
times.204 
This third technique is also quite similar to one employed by AIB’s John 
Rusnak. In addition to the fake options transactions detailed above, Rusnak hid his 
unauthorized positions by directly manipulating the inputs into AIB’s VaR 
calculations.205 These manipulations compromised the primary apparatus by which 
management monitored trading operations—and, as discussed above, by which 
bank regulators monitored AIB’s capital adequacy.206 Although AIB’s foreign 
exchange trading VaR limit thus was set at a mere $2.5 million (with $1.55 million 
of that allocated to Rusnak), it appeared that these risk limits were rarely exceeded. 
In fact, however, Rusnak consistently exceeded these VaR limits by a wide 
margin.207 
VaR manipulations at NAB, in contrast, followed a different—and more 
pernicious—pattern: because the bank lacked confidence in its VaR calculations, it 
simply ignored them, allowing the currency options desk to regularly exceed VaR 
                                                                                                                
199. Id. at 11.  
200. Id. at 21. 
201. Id. at 20. 
202. SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE, supra note 170, at 24. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. Kerviel cancelled these provision flows before the end of the month, the 
only time when they were monitored. Id. at 25. 
205. LUDWIG REPORT, supra note 144, at 14; see also supra notes 99–104 and 
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numbers for which were obtained directly from a spreadsheet provided by Rusnak. LUDWIG 
REPORT, supra note 144, at 14. Subsequent investigation revealed such manipulations of 
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14–15. 
206. LUDWIG REPORT, supra note 144, at 15; see discussion supra notes 99–104 
and accompanying text (use of VaR in regulatory oversight of capital adequacy). 
207. LUDWIG REPORT, supra note 144, at 15. 
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and other limits.208 Ironically, minutes from the May 2002 meeting of the NAB 
board committee charged with oversight of risk management and financial control 
indicate that the committee received a report on and discussed the foreign currency 
losses at AIB, but concluded that, because NAB used VaR and other measures to 
identify risk exposures, it was protected against such harm.209 
C. Organizational Change, Culture, and Compliance 
A review of the Société Générale scandal reveals a familiar pattern of 
organizational and departmental change that stressed trading and oversight 
systems, followed by a failure to respond to common red flags and warning 
signals. First, Kerviel’s division had experienced strong, rapid growth (a common 
element in prior rogue trading scandals), with trading personnel expanding from 
four to twenty-three in two years.210 The risk management and compliance 
departments were unable to keep pace with these changes. Although the size of 
middle office personnel doubled, they suffered frequent departures and were 
chronically understaffed. Moreover, despite a doubling in middle office staff size, 
many of the employees were new, undertrained, and lacking in sufficient 
experience.211 These problems were exacerbated by the weakness of Kerviel’s 
direct supervisor, his lack of supporting staff, and the initial tolerance of Kerviel’s 
unauthorized intraday positions, which created an environment that minimized the 
importance of internal controls.212 
Internal controls that fail to keep pace with rapid business growth was 
also identified as a factor contributing to the Nick Leeson rogue trading scandal at 
Barings. For example, as explained by John Dare, Director of Barings: 
They [Leeson’s unit] were usually in a bit of a catching-up position 
because their business had gone through a few periods of quite rapid 
growth, when it is challenging, to say the least, to keep your 
controls on top of a business that is growing rapidly. There were 
times when I was aware that this was a strain; that the front office 
were marching faster than the back office.213 
Rather than increasing their vigilance regarding potential employee 
misconduct in the wake of these business line and organizational changes, Société 
Générale ignored common warning signs of potential problems, breeding a culture 
of noncompliance. As stated by PricewaterhourseCoopers in its subsequent review 
of the event: 
                                                                                                                
208. NAB REPORT, supra note 150, at 23–24. 
209. Id. at 36, 48–49. 
210. SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE, supra note 170, at 7. 
211. Id.; see also LEESON & WHITLEY, supra note 1, at 28 (raising similar 
complaints regarding his staff at Barings); LUDWIG REPORT, supra note 144, at 18 
(discussing the inexperience and understaffing of risk management and audit at AIB). 
212. SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE, supra note 170, at 6–7. 
213. BANK OF ENG., REPORT OF THE BOARD OF BANKING SUPERVISION INQUIRY 
INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE COLLAPSE OF BARINGS, 1995, at 119 (copy on file with 
author). 
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Front office activities developed against the backdrop of a strong 
entrepreneurial culture based on trust. The surge in Delta One 
trading volumes and profits was accompanied by the emergence of 
unauthorised practices, with limits regularly exceeded and results 
smoothed or transferred between traders.214 
Similar cultures prevailed at AIB, Barings, NAB, and other financial 
institutions that suffered large rogue trading losses. For example, according to the 
Ludwig report, the bullying and intimidation of AIB’s back-office staff by Rusnak 
and front-office supervisors (and management’s willingness to overlook such 
behavior) contributed to an environment in which back-office operations were 
perceived as pointless formalities and management was predicted to take the 
trader’s side in the event of any dispute, since trading was the moneymaking 
operation.215 PricewaterhouseCoopers was even more explicit about the role 
played by a corporate culture of non-compliance at NAB: 
 Our investigations indicate that the culture fostered the 
environment that provided the opportunity for the Traders to incur 
losses, conceal them and escape detection despite ample warning 
signs. This enabled them to operate unchecked and flout the rules 
and standards of the National. Ultimately, the Board and the CEO 
must accept responsibility for the “tone at the top” and the culture 
that exists in certain parts of the National.216 
One of the most important warning signs ignored by Société Générale 
involved Kerviel’s earnings, which grew six-fold between 2006 and 2007 to 
constitute a substantial percentage of total desk (59%) and division (27%) 
earnings.217 These levels should have prompted further inquiry at Société 
Générale, particularly given Kerviel’s low seniority and experience, as well as his 
authorized trading strategy. Indeed, as elaborated below, Kerviel’s authorized 
trading activity could not possibly have accounted for such large profits.218 Yet, 
the failure to inquire into unusual growth in profits, risk, or trading volume—
particularly when that growth is inconsistent with the trader’s experience level, 
prior performance, or authorized trading strategy—is a common unifier of 
financial institutions damaged by rogue employees.219 
Rather than inquiring into the source of these spectacular profits, Société 
Générale instead ignored inquiries regarding trading anomalies from outsiders and 
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its own risk management personnel. On two occasions, in April and May 2007, 
trading managers failed to react to reports from risk management personnel 
regarding trading anomalies uncovered during a review of Kerviel’s trades, in 
which his responses to questions were evasive and incoherent.220 Later, in 
November 2007, the bank failed to respond to two written inquiries from EUREX, 
one of the world’s largest derivatives exchanges and Europe’s leading clearing 
house.221 One of these inquiries mentioned the purchase by Kerviel of 6000 DAX 
futures contracts in just two hours (a value of about EUR 1.2 billion).222 
Similar organizational indifference is evident in the case of Nick Leeson 
at Barings Bank, whose activities failed to arouse suspicion within Barings, long 
after rivals at other firms had noticed his increasing positions and risky trading 
strategy, generating market rumors that Leeson was engaged in substantial 
unauthorized trading activity.223 At the time of Barings’ collapse its positions on 
the Osaka exchange were eight times greater than its nearest rival, and its positions 
on the Singapore exchange were even larger.224 Yet Barings’ ignored repeated 
inquiries from SIMEX officials highlighting trading violations regarding account 
88888—an account about which Barings’ management later professed complete 
ignorance.225 Those within the firm who expressed concern with Leeson’s 
activities were put off with reassurances that management was investigating the 
matter.226 
AIB had similar incidents, in which it ignored inquiries from other banks, 
the SEC, and market sources.227 Kidder Peabody also ignored several inquiries 
from the Federal Reserve regarding Joseph Jett’s trading activity, which by May 
1993 had grown to represent 40–50% of all recon activity in the United States.228 
By this time, Jett’s recon trading had grown so large that his false profits 
accounted for 45% of Kidder’s 1993 profits,229 and his forward recon instructions 
on some bonds were so large that they exceeded the world-wide availability of the 
                                                                                                                
220. SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE, supra note 170, at 6. 
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component STRIPS.230 Despite this, four former Kidder employees claimed in 
litigation that their complaints that Jett’s forward recon trading strategy made no 
sense and could not possibly produce real profits were ignored.231 
NAB went a step further when another Australian bank raised concerns in 
March 2002 regarding the size and risk of the currency options trades emanating 
from NAB. NAB accused the inquiring bank of failing to comprehend NAB’s 
pricing models and trading strategy, and warned that if rumors regarding the 
bank’s concerns leaked into the marketplace, NAB would terminate its dealing 
relationship with the bank.232 
Other warning signs at Société Générale included inconsistent, 
unexplained cash flows, both positive and negative. For example, bank records 
indicate an excess cash flow from Kerviel of EUR 1.3 billion from December 28, 
2007 to January 1, 2008, and abnormally high borrowings of EUR 1 billion in July 
2007, neither of which elicited reaction from senior personnel.233 Moreover, the 
bank failed to investigate even known breaches by Kerviel of market risk limits, or 
the high, unexplained brokerage commissions paid on his unauthorized trading 
activity.234 
Finally, Kerviel’s reluctance to take a vacation, despite formal notices 
from his division manager on at least four occasions, is a classic sign of 
unauthorized employee activity and cover-up.235 Elaborate frauds such as those 
detailed in this Article require almost daily attention, and handing over control to 
another employee is likely to result in the detection—and thus deterrence—of 
fraud. This is why two-week vacations are “strongly encouraged” by regulatory 
authorities in the United States.236 Nonetheless, the refusal to take vacations is a 
common element in many rogue trading scandals, including Nick Leeson, John 
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Rusnak, and (the most extreme case by far) Toshihide Iguchi of Daiwa Bank, who 
refused to take a single day off during his entire eleven year tenure at the bank, for 
fear that his fraud would be detected.237 
Perhaps the most telling sign that supervisors and management of Société 
Générale were determinedly ignorant of Kerviel’s activities is the bank’s inability 
to reconcile Kerviel’s claimed profits and actual profits with his authorized 
activity, even months after revelation and investigation of the activity. This means 
that a significant portion of Kerviel’s 2007 profits, on which he was paid a 
substantial bonus, can be attributed to his fraudulent trading. To illustrate, Kerviel 
claimed profits in 2007 of EUR 43 million—EUR 25 million from proprietary 
trading (turbo warrant arbitrage) and EUR 18 million from client trading.238 
However, Kerviel’s authorized trading activity can explain only EUR 3 million in 
proprietary trading profits. Consequently, Kerviel’s unauthorized intraday or 
fraudulent overnight positions must explain the remainder. As explained in the 
General Inspection Department report: 
We have reconstituted, trade by trade, the earnings generated by 
arbitrage on competitors’ turbo warrants carried out by JK [Jerome 
Kerviel] and another trader from DLP. In total, these earnings are 
valued at EUR 5.5 million, including approximately EUR 3.1 
million attributable to JK and EUR 2.3 million attributable to the 
other trader (according to the most likely case scenario.) . . . It is 
very unlikely, even impossible, that JK could have generated 
earnings of EUR 22 million from pure intraday trading (which 
would in any case be an unauthorized activity.)239 
In sum, recall from Part II.C.1 that Basel II requires banks using the 
AMA to employ four mechanisms in calculating their operational risk capital 
charges: (1) internal loss data; (2) external loss data; (3) scenario analysis; and (4) 
BEICFs.240 The forgoing analysis in this Part suggests, however, that none of the 
financial institutions reporting large rogue trading losses would have captured the 
risk of these unauthorized losses in their internally generated operational loss data, 
because the mechanisms for measuring and recording that data had been easily 
bypassed. Moreover, each institution likely would have discounted the relevance 
of externally generated data showing operational risks of this magnitude, as each 
chose to ignore the lessons from prior rogue trading incidents at other financial 
institutions. Finally, it is implausible to think that any of the financial institutions 
discussed in this Part would have included a scenario such as that suggested by the 
massive losses eventually suffered when running scenario analyses, or that any 
would have interpreted their BEICFs as indicating that risks of these magnitudes 
existed. In other words, the enforced self-regulation of operational risk, such as 
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that embodied in Basel II, likely would have had no impact on the internal capital 
assessment leading up to any of the rogue trading events discussed in this Part. The 
same is likely true at any other financial institution determined to sacrifice 
operational risk controls in favor of trading profits. 
CONCLUSION 
The Basel II operational risk requirements represent part of a new breed 
of “responsive” or “enforced self-” regulation, under which the regulated group is 
allowed substantial involvement in its own oversight in an attempt to encourage 
more effective, efficient regulatory solutions. Although enforced self-regulation 
provides the hope of more workable regulation, the open-ended rules characteristic 
of enforced self-regulation also present opportunities for private actors with a stake 
in the interpretation of legal rules (“legal intermediaries,” as they are termed in this 
Article) to press an interpretation that enhances their own position and welfare vis-
à-vis the regulated group. That interpretation may be inconsistent with the public 
interest or regulatory efficiency. In the case of operational risk, the relevant legal 
intermediaries include the accounting profession (with an existing expertise in 
internal controls), legal professionals (with an existing expertise in organizational 
governance and compliance), and risk management experts (with an existing 
expertise in measurement and modeling). 
The interests of these legal intermediaries are tempered by bank 
management’s interest in an interpretation of Basel II that minimizes the costs of 
compliance and disrupts existing business practice as little as possible. In 
particular, management is likely to resist any measures that could undermine the 
carefully crafted institutional norms of materialism, risk-taking, and independence 
on which many successful trading environments thrive. 
This is not to suggest that operational risk cannot be substantial, or that its 
management should not be a serious concern of financial institutions. In fact, just 
the opposite is true. Although some have argued that operational risk regulation is 
inappropriate because it is diversifiable by shareholders, there is no denying that 
operational risk may be very large, exceeding market risk at some institutions.241 
Moreover, recent events have starkly demonstrated that bank stability and 
soundness are considered important for reasons unrelated to shareholder profits. 
As a result, unchecked operational risk is a legitimate cause for regulatory concern. 
What, then, are the specific dangers posed by the operational risk 
provisions of Basel II? One might argue that perhaps now banks will at least be 
forced to focus on operational risk and keep more capital on hand. Surely such 
measures, even if imperfect, can only make banks safer. Although it is too early to 
fully evaluate the effects of Basel II, there is reason to be skeptical of such a 
conclusion. 
First, some enforced self-regulation, including the operational risk 
provisions of Basel II, may present a convenient but largely cosmetic fix. Such 
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fixes can be costly, potentially luring regulators and firm stakeholders (and maybe 
even firm management) into a false sense of confidence. 
Second, workable, politically feasible regulatory options for addressing 
operational risk were available to the committee. By proceeding incrementally, 
working within the regulatory structure already in existence in most major banking 
countries, including the United States, Basel could have made at least some 
inroads into those operational events, such as rogue trading, most likely to 
contribute to bank failure. 
Third, the Basel II operational risk provisions may displace resources that 
would be better spent on more effective risk measures. For example, Basel II may 
create a perverse incentive to “manage the model rather than reality,” diverting 
resources toward reducing the estimates of operational risk, rather than reducing 
operational risk itself.242  
Finally, the incentives fostered by Basel II to create a numerical measure 
of operational risk may cause a focus on those aspects of operational risk most 
easily quantified—the high-frequency, low-impact events, such as routine 
employee errors—rather than on the more challenging and elusive aspects of 
operational risk, such as rogue trading, that may pose the greatest threat to 
financial institutions. 
One might conclude from this that Basel II effectively incentivizes banks 
to account for high-frequency, low-impact events, such as “fat fingers” and other 
routine employee errors and mishaps. If true, this represents at best a small gain in 
terms of bank safety that in all probability is outweighed by the regulatory costs 
and does little or nothing to address the real sources of bank failure risk. Moreover, 
banks already have an incentive to reduce these risks up to the point at which the 
costs equal the benefits, and there are no obvious indications that banks are not 
currently doing so. 
In the end, it is hard to predict the future of operational risk regulation at a 
time almost certainly on the verge of substantial industry, regulatory, and market 
change. But Basel itself has given no indication of rethinking its problematic 
approach to operational risk regulation. Although the Committee has proposed a 
variety of changes to the Basel II Accord in light of the current financial crisis—
including the addition of an incremental risk capital charge for unsecuritized credit 
products and the introduction of a stressed VaR requirement—the proposals to 
date relate to Basel’s market risk provisions and do not specifically address Basel 
II’s regulation of operational risk.243 Moreover, the new proposals do not veer 
substantially from the enforced self-regulatory approach to market risk 
management established in 1996. This attention to market risk measures is to be 
expected in light of the current market and political climate, but operational risk 
remains a significant source of bank failure risk, and one unlikely to be positively 
affected by Basel’s current (or currently proposed) regulatory interventions. 
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